Seattle Journal for Social Justice
Volume 3

Issue 1

Article 32

November 2004

Our Selma Is Here: The Political and Legal Struggle for
Educational Equality in Denver, Colorado, and Multiracial
Conundrums in American Jurisprudence
Tom I. Romero II

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/sjsj

Recommended Citation
Romero, Tom I. II (2004) "Our Selma Is Here: The Political and Legal Struggle for Educational Equality in
Denver, Colorado, and Multiracial Conundrums in American Jurisprudence," Seattle Journal for Social
Justice: Vol. 3: Iss. 1, Article 32.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/sjsj/vol3/iss1/32

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Publications and Programs at Seattle
University School of Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Seattle Journal for Social Justice
by an authorized editor of Seattle University School of Law Digital Commons.

73

Our Selma Is Here: The Political and Legal
Struggle for Educational Equality in Denver,
Colorado, and Multiracial Conundrums in
American Jurisprudence
Tom I. Romero II1
In late October 1968, the Denver Board of Education for School District
Number One of the City and County of Denver (the School Board) held its
monthly meeting.2 Like most of its recent meetings, the gathering of the
School Board promised to provoke a heated exchange over the efficacy of
Superintendent Dr. Robert Gilberts’s plan (the Gilberts Plan) to desegregate
the district’s schools.3 As a sizeable crowd filed into the auditorium, a large
and boisterous group of Chicanos made their presence known.4 Singing We
Shall Overcome loudly in Spanish, the “Chicano”5 attendees occupied
several seats near the stage. Not long into the meeting, Rodolfo “Corky”
Gonzales, the well-known ex-prize fighter, emerged from the crowd.6
Gonzales “stepped to the speaker’s platform, accompanied by several blackbereted followers,” who proceeded to form a semicircle around him.7
Although Gonzales had been scheduled to make a statement before the
School Board later in the evening, he instead used an intermission in the
proceedings to give his own impression on the Gilberts Plan.8
The president of the School Board immediately demanded that Gonzales
step down and ordered the microphone and television cameras shut off.9
Undeterred, Gonzales pulled out a bullhorn and then proceeded to read a
two-page statement demanding, among other things, that any equality of
educational opportunity plan include provisions for bilingual education,
community control of schools, and a Chicano-based curriculum.10
According to Gonzales, the Gilberts Plan, which called for limited busing of
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minority students, failed on all accounts and by this measure was
“misleading, false, facetious and pretentious” to the goal of desegregation .11
At the conclusion of his statement, Gonzales declared that integration,
particularly the solution of busing, “[is] obviously not a panacea . . . [it]
won’t solve the problems of Mexican American youth.”12 Gonzales warned
that if the Gilberts Plan were instituted “the future may hold the burning of
racist books, boycotts of schools, and vacant lots where schools now
stand.”13 Then, Gonzales and nearly one hundred Chicano supporters
emptied the room, leaving board members Allegra Saunders, A. Edgar
Benton, Dr. John Amesse, and Superintendent Robert Gilberts to try to
restore order.14
The demands made by Gonzales on behalf of Denver’s Chicano youth
typified the complexities of school integration in cities with racially diverse
student populations during the desegregation era. Providing education to a
geographically, racially, and ethnically broad student body, the Denver
Public School (DPS) system attempted to balance a host of conflicting
demands made upon educators, administrators, students, parents, and
teachers in the Denver metropolitan area. In 1969, “Negro,” “Hispano,”
and “Anglo” parents sued the DPS Board on behalf of their children
because it was unable to respond effectively to many of these challenges.15
This case, Keyes v. School District No. 1, received national attention,
becoming the first non-southern school desegregation case heard by the
United States Supreme Court.16
Significantly, Keyes posed a set of questions never before encountered by
the Supreme Court. Chief among such questions was how segregation
would be determined and integration achieved in a city not split along black
and white lines.17 While non-white and non-black students, parents, and
activists like Rodolfo Gonzales struggled for a culturally wide-ranging and
racially sophisticated concept of school desegregation, the ultimate inability
of the then-current constitutional jurisprudence to articulate a meaningful
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understanding of a multiracial student body severely fractured the political
and legal efforts to integrate Denver’s public schools.
This article analyzes the attempts by Denver’s administrators, parents,
students, and courts to achieve equality of educational opportunity among a
racially diverse student body. Although this struggle is rooted in the
revolution catalyzed by Brown v. Board of Education,18 it both predates the
Brown decision and signifies the extent to which distinctive multiracial
tensions and experiences emerged outside of those encountered by courts
deciding cases based in the Jim Crow American South.19 The article begins
its discussion in part I with a narrative describing the DPS system’s attempt
to integrate Chicano students by adopting a philosophy of cultural pluralism
in the classroom and in the curriculum in the late 1940s and 1950s.
Although at the outset administrators believed that this philosophy would
serve as a model for racial relations in Denver’s public schools, in time the
method proved incapable of diffusing the multiple and divergent color lines
taking shape in the city.
Part II addresses the experiences of African American students in the
same system during the 1950s and 1960s. In a series of highly contested
administrative decisions regarding school boundaries and attendance
policies during this time, the DPS system exacerbated the problem of school
segregation caused, in part, by residential segregation. As a result, African
American parents and students who were dissatisfied with identifiable racial
schools in the DPS forced administrators into a grudging acknowledgment
of widespread racial inequality in the multiracial school district. However,
it was not until 1968 and 1969 that the Denver School Board attempted to
respond systematically to the inequality and segregation of its schools.
Part III analyzes a series of school walk outs in the late 1960s by Chicano
students, parents, and activists. Although these parents, students, and
activists mobilized against discriminatory treatment directed against
Chicano students, their protests fundamentally challenged the ability of the
DPS to provide equal education for all of its students. Similar to well-
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known nonviolent civil rights protests in the American South, the Chicano
demand for educational equality turned into a violent and bloody
confrontation.20 Denver’s Chicanos declared that their “Selma [was]
here,”21 claiming that educational equality was as essential to the American
creed as the civil rights demands of African Americans. However, these
students, parents, and activists articulated a much different vision of
integration than the ones proposed by many in Denver as well as the
nation’s white and black communities.
Such issues passionately intersected with the filing of Keyes in 1969. As
Judge William Doyle of the United States District Court, Colorado, quickly
discovered, there were inherent problems in applying the Constitution to
populations where the question of “majority” and “minority” were not clear.
Part IV of the article examines the legal foreground of school desegregation
in the Denver metropolitan area and the jurisprudential resolution of the
questions raised by a multiracial student body. The Keyes case focused not
only on the discriminatory actions of the School Board, but also on the
social, economic, and political place that Denver’s Mexican American
community held vis-à-vis whites and blacks. To the extent that different
racial groups in the city had dissimilar visions of educational opportunity,
this section unravels the difficult decisions that the federal courts made in
giving meaning to and ultimately collapsing racial differences among
Denver’s communities.
By 1975, appellate decisions and an amendment to the Colorado
Constitution left the future of educational equality in the tri-ethnic DPS
system on very uncertain ground, while simultaneously solidifying the clear
racial polarization of the city. In a city divided along black, brown, and
white lines, the issue of educational and social equity posed complicated
and multifaceted questions not envisioned by the court-ordered biracial
desegregation strategies applied in the American South. Indeed, as the
United States Supreme Court explicitly suggested when it made its decision,
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Denver’s “tri-ethnic” or, perhaps more accurately, “tri-racial” situation had
national implications for a rapidly transforming United States.22

I. THE “DENVER EXPERIMENT”: MEXICAN AMERICANS AND
CULTURAL PLURALISM IN DENVER’S PUBLIC SCHOOLS
Beginning shortly after the end of the World War II, DPS administrators
and educators confronted the issue of how to assimilate a newly diverse
ethnic and racial student body. Unlike some metropolitan areas in the
American West, the DPS never adopted an official and explicit policy of
racial or ethnic segregation of its classrooms, nor did state law legally
prescribe such a result.23 As the shifting boundaries of Denver’s diverse
populations brought racial tension, especially between Mexican Americans
and other racial groups, directly into the area’s schools, Denver’s
demographic transformation in the middle of the twentieth century forced
the DPS to confront the meaning of educational equality.24 As a result, DPS
officials, as well as parents and civil rights activists, hoped that a
pedagogical practice known as “cultural pluralism” would bring about
positive results. According to one proponent of this philosophy,
modern educators have confirmed the principle that the public
schools and the public school curriculum should properly reflect
the total culture. Now, we who are cultural pluralists or
intercultural educationists, insist that the total culture does not
mean only the dominant culture. The total culture embraces every
ethnic, racial, or religious group in our midst.25
Dubbed by one commentator as the “Denver Experiment,” the DPS’s early
post-World War II cultural pluralism programs highlighted the difficulties
of embracing “every ethnic, racial, or religious group” in the public school
system.26
The DPS’s first indication of systemic deficiency came soon after the end
of World War II when Denver teachers lobbied the school board for
information and material regarding the many groups residing in the city.27
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These teachers wanted to include in their curriculum a study of the ethnic
and racial geography and history of Denver including “which racial groups
settled here, where they came from, why they left their previous homes,
why they came here, what they found, how they adjusted themselves to the
physical and social conditions, and what share each group has had in the
building of our city as we know it today.”28 Yet, the recognition of the
diversity of Denver’s citizenry was not the sole reason behind such
curricular changes. Rather, tensions between Mexican American students
and other groups in junior high and high school compelled Denver
educators to speed the process of “intercultural” exchange and education.29
As a result, the DPS developed two specific divergent intercultural
programs to resolve racial differences and discrimination among these
groups.
The first project developed out of a desire by DPS educators to develop
an “intergroup” curriculum beginning as early as 1947.30 One of the
outcomes of this work was an effort to develop knowledge about the
different “Americans” in the public schools.31 A group of Denver junior
high teachers coordinated the first project in 1951.32 The teachers, with the
support of several principals, school administrators, and community
activists, produced the first and only textbook called The People of Denver:
Book One, Spanish-Speaking People.33 The book attempted to “set forth
pertinent information” about Denver’s most recent newcomers through
historical narrative, oral testimony, and illustration.34 From the housing
trials and tribulations of the Martinez family to the discriminatory treatment
in employment experienced by Victor Joseph, the book personified the
ways that many Mexican Americans had been relegated to the lowest rungs
of Denver’s social order.35
The DPS and the Mayor’s Commission on Human Relations established
the second broader-based program in 1953.36 This program, called the CitySchool Project (the Project) attempted to address the high delinquency,
truancy, and dropout rates among the city’s Spanish American youth.37 The
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goal of the Project was simple: “[a]s the public schools are the nation’s
time-honored assimilative institution, what is more natural under American
customs than that the city and its public schools should work together to
bring about the complete integration of Spanish-surnamed citizens.”38
The Project’s strategies to “integrate” the Denver’s Mexican American
youth ranged from after-school reading programs to health service clinics.
Through these efforts, the Project proponents hoped to promote
understanding about Denver’s Mexican Americans and tolerance among
those school and government officials and administrators who came into
daily contact with the larger community.39 As DPS administrators took
explicit notice of multiracial differences in the schools, it became evident
that the intercultural approach to education attempted by these programs
would not be able to overcome these divides.
On the one hand, the Project catalyzed intense and often positive
engagements between municipal bureaucrats, parents, students, and
community activists.40 On the other hand, some programs produced and
sponsored by Project educators tended to focus on Mexican Americans in
negative ways.41 At the inception of the Project, for instance, one DPS
principal made the following observation: “[n]ow that there are more of the
Spanish Americans, they feel there is safety in number[s]. . . . Because most
of them are not so large and strong as the average Anglo, they feel they
have to use clubs, knives, and other weapons.”42 Accordingly, the question
of cultural pluralism did not revolve around the issue of how Mexican
Americans culturally contributed to the educational process; rather, as one
teacher adamantly declared, the question is “how to help these people learn
to handle Anglo life and culture effectively.”43
In 1962, the intercultural approach to the integration of DPS students was
dealt a serious blow when the United States Supreme Court struck down a
New York school district’s decision to allow “nonsectarian” prayer in its
schools.44 Although the decision specifically threatened the nominally
related issue of religious plurality in the Denver Public Schools, it also
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symbolized a great deal of skepticism about the intercultural approach to
integration. For example, one participant in a cultural workshop vividly
complained: “[t]o concentrate upon the Spanish community per se is to pose
the problem as being only one-sided, and indeed may unreasonably
inculcate a general feeling of inferiority by undue emphasis of the
assumption that the culture is less desirable and therefore subject to
investigation.”45 Though proponents of cultural pluralism anticipated many
of the sociological arguments that would be made in relation to school
desegregation litigation,46 its application contributed to a negative
perception of Mexican Americans in Denver’s public schools as well as in
the larger community.47
By the mid-1960s, little remained in the DPS’s general curriculum
regarding the culture, history, and contributions of Denver’s largest and
most visible minority groups because of a lack of institutional and
community support. Instead, as part II shows, growing numbers of black
students in the city and their movement across previously impenetrable
neighborhood boundaries forced school administrators and educators to
revisit the meaning of integration. Ironically, in a school district that
previously attempted to integrate its students through intercultural
exchange, Denver witnessed an alarming rise in the number of racially
segregated and by legal definition, unequal and inferior schools.

II. BOUNDARIES AND BORDERS: AFRICAN AMERICANS AND
NEIGHBORHOOD SCHOOLS
On a warm September afternoon in 1956, several thousand people filled
the Denver Auditorium beyond its capacity. Many, if not all, of the people
in the audience were delegates to the annual national convention of the
National Baptist Church held in Denver, and all had come to hear the
Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. give the keynote address.48 Dr. King’s
message centered on the convention’s main theme: civil rights and the
compelling need for integration not only in the South, but throughout the
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United States.49 The Denver meeting provided Dr. King a perfect
opportunity to take integration out of its southern setting. In addressing the
convention’s participants Dr. King stated that “[t]he cancer of segregation
cannot be cured by gradualism. The United States cannot afford to slow up
the move toward justice. The very life of this nation and its future position
in the world affairs depend upon how we dispose of the matter of racial
integration.”50
Dr. King’s message held particular resonance for many parents in
Denver’s black community. Only a few months earlier, a group of black
parents had engaged in a heated conflict over “inferior” schools in the heart
of Denver’s Five Points Neighborhood with the current Superintendent
Kenneth Oberholtzer and the Denver School Board.51 At the heart of the
debates to desegregate Denver’s schools was the meaning and maintenance
of racial borders erected in Denver since World War II. This section
accordingly assesses the contradictory ways that Denverites battled both to
shatter and maintain the color line that had been established around their
neighborhoods. The resulting inability of the DPS to achieve a meaningful
racial balance among African Americans and whites in Denver’s Public
Schools only worked to polarize racial tensions in the Denver School
District and larger metropolis.
The push for racial balance in Denver began in earnest in 1956, when
African Americans and other parents forced attention to the stark
differences in the school district’s junior and senior high schools.
Inequality among Denver’s various public schools had been a point of
contention between DPS officials and parents since the late 1940s. In
response to parents’ concerns about overcrowding, an aging physical plant,
and the emergence of African Americans as a significant portion of the
student body, the DPS Board decided to tear down and rebuild a new high
school located in the heart of Denver’s African American neighborhood in
the 1950s.52
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The hopes of African American parents and the promises made by the
DPS Board, however, were quickly dashed. Although the new Manual
High School was the newest high school in Denver, parents and students
were disappointed when the school opened its doors.53
Parents soon
discovered that the School Board drew the attendance boundary for the
school in a manner that reduced racial integration rather than promoted
integration.54 Just as troubling, the School Board left little money for
furnishing the school or buying new books. It had a “weak and watereddown curriculum, [and had a] large number of probationary teachers.”55
Moreover, school officials enforced segregation in explicit ways.
According to one account, the dean of the girls at Manual High “lectured”
and “belittled” “Caucasian, Spanish, or Japanese girl[s] who [were] friendly
with a Negro boy . . . [and] on one occasion where the girl resented the
‘advice,’ [the dean] encouraged the parents to take her to a psychiatrist.”56
In January 1956, Peter Holme, Assistant Superintendent of the Denver
Public Schools, made a proposal to redraw the “optional” and “mandatory”
attendance zones for Manual High School and its respective feeder junior
high school.57 Though Holme and other DPS officials noted that the
boundary change was a necessary measure to respond to the demographic
change in Denver, African American parents and activists believed that the
policy was designed to contain the movement of the black community.58 As
a result, African American parents organized to fight the suggested
boundary change.59 One group charged the DPS administration with
knowingly segregating Negro and Mexican American students.60 Instead of
accepting Holme’s plan, these parents asked the DPS Board and the
administration to extend the mandatory attendance zone of predominately
African American schools in order to increase their zone’s white student
population.61
In addition to the racial imbalance of these schools, a local citizen’s
committee was also troubled by differences between the educational
curricula of black and white high schools located in adjacent
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neighborhoods.62 At the predominately white high school, students could
take college preparatory classes such as Shakespeare, Modern History,
Advanced Mathematics, and Latin while students at the largely black high
school had remedial and vocational options such as Career Home
Economics, Office Practice, and Photography.63
In the DPS
administration’s estimation, educational differences in schools were to be
expected. According to Superintendent Oberholtzer, curriculum differences
were “a matter of student choice” because more students from the white
high school were going to college.64 Such an attitude begged the question
from one parent: were fewer students considering college at the
predominantly minority schools because they did not want to further their
education or because a vocational curriculum, inadequate counseling, and
poorly trained teachers led to no other result?65
In spite of the administration’s opposition to curricular change, the
Denver School Board and DPS officials, including Superintendent
Oberholtzer, decided to study the attendance proposal submitted by some of
the African American parents.66 This decision, in turn, raised consternation
among several white parents in the potentially affected areas.67 In early
spring, Oberholtzer received a petition from some four hundred residents of
one white neighborhood warning that its parents would refuse to send their
children to the African American high school if they were included in the
school’s boundaries.68
On June 20, 1956, the School Board met and approved Assistant
Superintendent Holme’s original recommendations to redraw the attendance
boundaries that reflected the highly segregated nature of Denver’s
neighborhoods.69 In response, LeJean Clark, chair of a citizen’s committee
organized to fight unequal schools in their East Denver neighborhood,
charged that the School Board and its administration had “a designed plan
of segregation.”70 Inspired by the language and spirit of Brown, decided
only two years earlier, Denver parents threatened to sue the School Board

VOLUME 3 • ISSUE 1 • 2004

84

SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

and its administration for unconstitutionally maintaining two separate and
unequal schools.71
In contrast to the factual situation in Brown and its companion cases,
discriminatory animus on the part of the DPS Board and its administration
was hard to define. Indeed, the DPS often took positions that indicated its
administrators' ambivalence about the issue of racial segregation. For
example, one Denver Urban League and DPS report studied minority
teacher employment in the DPS from 1946 to 1957.72 The report found that
“the number of Negro teachers has increased from five in 1946 to seventyfive regular and eight substitute teachers as of May 1957. Negroes are now
teaching in fourteen elementary, two junior high and one senior high school
in Denver; in 1946 they taught at only one elementary school . . . . The
number of teachers from other minority groups has also increased.”73 Yet,
other evidence indicated problems with this policy. Of the black and other
minority teachers that the school district hired, almost all were placed in
schools with predominately minority student bodies.74 Also of concern was
evidence that many DPS principals “sought the approval of white faculty
members before they would place a black teacher in a white school. Some
[white] property owners . . . were afraid that [black teachers] and their
families might move” into all-white neighborhoods.75 Such collective data
led Denver Urban League Director Sebastian Owens to argue that the
segregation of “Negro teachers give[s] some basis to a community feeling”
that the DPS used attendance boundaries to mask discriminatory practices.76
The neighborhood school policy of hiring minority teachers and the
pedagogy of cultural pluralism obscured the legal culpability of the Denver
Public Schools, its School Board, and its administration in maintaining
segregated and unequal schools.77 In fact, no other recently litigated school
desegregation case presented such seemingly contradictory tendencies on
the part of a school board and its administration. Thus, because of the lack
of an explicit district policy that compelled segregation, lawyers
representing the Denver chapters of the American Civil Liberties Union

FROM BROWN TO GRUTTER: RACIAL INTEGRATION AND THE LAW

Our Selma Is Here 85

(ACLU) and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People (NAACP), as well as the Denver Urban League decided to forego a
legal challenge to bring DPS in compliance with Brown.78 Yet, many
continued to believe that the DPS Board and its administration improperly
took race into account when making its decisions. As NAACP lawyer Sam
Menin noted, “[t]his is a subtle type of discrimination that is difficult to put
your finger on, but we know it exists.”79
The DPS policies through the first half of the 1960s, especially in regard
to school boundaries and the maintenance of neighborhood schools, further
divided Denverites.80 The Denver School Board, however, repeatedly
affirmed that the racial identity of local students played no part in its
decisions.81 Instead, DPS administrators and officials argued that a school’s
student body should be strictly anchored to the neighborhoods of which
they were a part. According to one school board member, “[w]e don’t keep
track by race. We put schools where the children are . . . . If we have ghetto
schools it’s because we have ghettos. The basic answer to this problem is
the dispersion of the Negro population . . . the school board is not
responsible for neighborhood housing patterns, you are.”82 In the minds of
many DPS Board members, the legal mandates of Brown compelled such a
colorblind approach.83
However, continued pressure, including a threatened boycott by African
American parents and other concerned civic groups, compelled the School
Board to appoint a Special Study Committee on Equality of Education
Opportunity (Study Committee) in 1962.84 Two years later, the Study
Committee found that the School Board’s actions contributed to
segregation, even though there was no official policy to segregate Denver’s
students.85 Taken together, the Denver Public Schools contained clusters of
minority racial (“Negro”) and ethnic (“Spanish-surnamed”) groups within
the city that made unavailable to these children “the democratic experience
of education with members of other race[s] and groups with which they will
have to live and compete.”86
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In spite of the report’s attempt to distinguish Denver’s largest minority
groups on the basis of race and ethnicity, it nonetheless found that
concentrations of specifically black and Mexican Americans in a
neighborhood school system only perpetuated the poor scholastic
achievements of minority students.87 As a result, the Study Committee
concluded that Denver’s minority groups would “never be able to compete
and succeed in accordance with the standards of the dominant urban middle
class culture” if the DPS adhered to the status quo.88
In response to the Study Committee’s report, the DPS adopted a change,
but not a repudiation of the neighborhood school concept.89 The
administration “recognized that all children within the School District,
regardless of racial or ethnic background, are equally entitled to the benefits
of good education and that to secure such benefits the needs and aspirations
of all children must be considered” to combat “barriers of prejudice,
discrimination, and ignorance.”90 Although the DPS administration argued
that it did not intend to abandon the “neighborhood school principle,” it
hoped to incorporate “changes or adaptations which would result in a more
diverse or heterogeneous racial and ethnic school population, for both
pupils and school employees.91 The School Board thus committed the
Denver Public Schools in theory, if not in practice, to addressing racial
segregation in its schools.92
In spite of such actions, however, the DPS Board and its administration
continued to keep the district’s black and Mexican American students
concentrated in certain schools. While DPS bused white students into the
city’s and the school district’s newly annexed areas in southeast and
southwest Denver to alleviate school overcrowding, the administration
utilized mobile and temporary classroom units to respond to overcrowding
in black and Mexican American schools.93 In such schools, parents and
activists derogatorily referred to these mobile units as “Oberholtzer
Wagons.”94
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To many, it was becoming clear that DPS needed to respond more
actively to the concentration of black and Mexican American students.95
The choices, however, were not popular. As one news article declared,
DPS could educate students in segregated classrooms or it could achieve
racial balance by busing.96 The article stated that many Denver parents,
especially the city’s whites, found busing repugnant.97 However, the failure
to achieve racial balance in Denver’s schools led minority parents to
demonstrate at school board meetings and to again threaten a lawsuit
against the school district.98 The Denver School Board “caught between
two strong arguments . . . favored study rather than action. They wanted to
put the whole question into the hands of a committee to be composed in
large part of minority group persons.”99 To appease both sides, in 1966, the
DPS ordered limited busing for a few select schools and commissioned
another taskforce to study the feasibility of maintaining neighborhood
schools in the face of widespread residential segregation.100
The Advisory Council on Equality of Educational Opportunity (Advisory
Council) was comprised of thirty citizens selected from all facets of the
Denver community.101
Membership was designed to represent the
complexity of minority interests and social identities in the Denver area. 102
Perhaps the biggest obstacle faced by the Advisory Council was the
“practical considerations involved in efforts to eliminate inequalities of
educational opportunity” in a diverse, yet segregated community.103
Given the highly divisive and emotional nature of the desegregation
debate, the Advisory Council’s final report thus attempted to appease all
sides. The report of the council first reaffirmed the practicality of
neighborhood schools, but recognized that racial and ethnic disparity
existed in the school system.104 The Advisory Council argued that “due
consideration must be given to certain basic legal principles and decisions
enunciated by” the nation’s federal courts.105 Indeed, the Advisory Council
pointed out that “the question now confronting all school boards where such
racially imbalanced schools exist in fact is whether there is an affirmative
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duty to integrate and to correct racial imbalances. So far, the United States
Supreme Court has not ruled directly on this . . . question.”106
Although the Advisory Council found that jurisprudence and statutory
precedent suggested a legal duty to respond to de facto segregation, they
nevertheless argued that the Colorado Constitution required “the State, its
agencies and political subdivisions to be color-blind rather than colorconscious.”107
In “view of the above-stated conflicting legal and
constitutional principles,” the Advisory Council made several
recommendations “to evolve feasible methods of achieving integration and
quality education without violating fundamental legal and constitutional
doctrines.”108 Consequently, the Advisory Council recommended voluntary
busing, intensive compensatory education in black and Mexican American
schools, the creation of an educational park in a neighborhood straddling
one black and white community, and the establishment of a Cultural Arts
Center where all students (one-half day a week) would learn about “the
cultural contributions by various ethnic components of our region, including
European, Negro, Hispanic, American Indian of the Southwest and Plains
regions, [and] other ethnic groups.”109
The Advisory Council’s report called for broad-based programs including
voluntary integration, continued use of neighborhood schools, and even
revived the idea of cultural pluralism in the curriculum.110 Nevertheless, the
recommendations were harshly criticized.111 Indeed, Advisory Council
member Stephen Knight expressed a scathing critique of the Advisory
Council’s recommendations in a Minority Report to the larger council’s
recommendations.112 The Minority Report articulated a fear that Denver
schools would be used as a “forced instrument of integration” and
consequently, would not alleviate the housing, employment, government,
social, and economic problems of the city’s largest minority groups.113 To
further distinguish the multiracial nature of the issue, the Minority Report
argued that insufficient attention had been paid to the city’s white majority,
who, at a personal sacrifice, moved into areas on the basis of neighborhood
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schools.114 The Minority Report warned that if the neighborhood-school
concept was undermined through the adoption of the Advisory Council’s
recommendations, “mainly [w]hite, middle-income” Denverites would
leave the city and be replaced by the “in-migration of low-skill, low
income, multi-problem families.”115 Although the Minority Report did not
mention the race or ethnicity of such supposed problem families, its tone
nevertheless suggested a degree of racial polarization over Denver’s attempt
to achieve equality of educational opportunity.
Despite the Minority Report’s scathing review, later in November 1967,
Denver citizens voted on a bond issue to implement the Advisory Council’s
recommendations.116 However, for the first time since 1938, Denverites, by
a margin of three to one, failed to endorse a school bond issue.117
Notwithstanding the bond vote setback, two DPS Board members
introduced Resolution 1490 to the School Board on April 25, 1968. The
resolution served as a response to the reality that the “continuation of
neighborhood schools has resulted in the concentration of some minority
racial and ethnic groups”118 and required the DPS superintendent to prepare
a comprehensive integration plan for the DPS system by September 1968.119
After a month of acrimonious debate, the DPS Board, by a margin of five to
two, voted to adopt the resolution. The School Board then asked DPS’s
new superintendent, Dr. Robert Gilberts, to devise a plan to implement the
School Board’s integration policy.120
One of the members voting against the resolution, Stephen Knight, author
of the Minority Report, again voiced his opposition to forced integration.121
According to Knight, the DPS Board had been overly influenced by the
“pressures of a small group of misdirected people” and its actions were
“contrary to the wishes” of Denver’s white majority.122 Despite vocal and
strident opposition, Superintendent Gilberts’s desegregation plan was
enacted through a series of resolutions between January and April of
1969.123 Shortly after the School Board passed the first of the three
resolutions, one angry parent declared: “[a]s of last Monday (the day the
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school board began discussing the integration resolution), the value of my
home decreased 10 percent.”124 Other parents suggested that they would
move away from Denver rather than be bullied by integrationist beatniks
and hippies whom they believed had appropriated the School Board.125
As such sentiments made clear, school integration signified the extent
that racial tension polarized Denver during the 1960s. While the issue
appeared split between black and white lines, many Chicano Denverites, the
city’s largest minority group, had their own ideas about neighborhood
schools and integration.

III. THE CHICANO/A RESPONSE TO INTEGRATION
Seemingly lost in Denver’s integration debates was the role that the city’s
Chicanos would play in both policies. While Mexican Americans were
collectively Denver’s largest and most impoverished minority group, they
did not easily fit into the racial politics of school desegregation and
metropolitan growth.126 As a result, the desegregation debate emerged in
public discourse as a black and white issue. However, the DPS’s Advisory
Council reports made clear that Mexican American students were
increasingly concentrated in many substandard Denver schools.127 As
Rodolfo Gonzales’s interruption of the DPS Board meeting in 1968
demonstrated, the convergence of interests among the city’s non-white
groups was not as seamless as many assumed.128 While Chicano activists,
parents, and students knew well the consequences of discrimination and
racial inequality, many were highly skeptical about racial balance and
busing as a solution.129
As a result, Denver’s Chicano community articulated a fundamentally
different understanding and definition of integration in comparison to the
general understanding of the term in the black community. This section
accordingly analyzes a series of school walkouts by Denver’s Chicano
students in 1969 to demonstrate a Mexican American vision of equal
education. Rather than working to achieve racial balance in the numbers of
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minority and non-minority students in Denver schools, Chicanos in the
Denver metropolitan area attempted to achieve integration and equality by
forcing the school district to come to grips with the unique needs and
concerns of Mexican American students.
On February 27, 1969, concerned parents, students, and Chicano
activists, including Rodolfo Gonzales and school board member A. Edgar
Benton, met with West High School administrators over concerns that
social studies teacher Harry B. Shafer allegedly made racist and bigoted
remarks to Chicano students.130 At the meeting, Chicano students and
parents confronted Shafer about allegations that he had said, “If you eat
Mexican food you’ll get stupid and even look like a Mexican . . . Hispanos
are stupid because their parents are stupid and their parents were stupid.”131
At the meeting Shafer explained that “he had made the statements but only
in an attempt to prompt debate, not as an insult.”132 Despite pleas by
Chicano parents and activists that Shafer be immediately dismissed for his
actions, school officials instead ordered an investigation into the teacher’s
conduct.133 A few days later, Shafer argued that he had been subjected to a
kangaroo court when he filed a grievance with the Denver Classroom
Teachers Association in order to protect his interests.134
Not long after this meeting, Superintendent Gilberts became involved.135
After interviewing students, parents, and teachers for a week, Gilberts
declared that Shafer’s actions were not motivated by bias, bigotry, or
discrimination.136
In a letter to Shafer and West High School’s
administration, Gilberts declared: “It is our judgment that these charges
have not been substantiated and do not seem to reflect either Mr. Shafer’s
philosophy or conduct.”137 Despite being exonerated, Shafer, in a meeting
with Gilberts on March 19, asked to be transferred to another school.138
Angered by the result of Gilberts’s findings, Chicano students presented a
list of demands to West High School’s administration and stated that they
would walk out of classes if their demands were not met.139
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The demands made by Chicano students signified the extent to which
they viewed Shafer’s conduct as something more systemic than individual
bigotry and bias. The students asked not only for Shafer’s resignation, but
they also pressed the DPS administration to place Mexican Americans at the
center of its efforts to eliminate prejudice and bigotry in Denver’s public
schools.140 The students demanded the implementation of Chicano culture
and history classes and bilingual education programs from kindergarten
through high school, the creation of a West High Neighborhood School
Board, and a dramatic reduction in class sizes.141 The ultimate goal was to
encourage a reorientation of the curriculum and school structure to
emphasize varying perspectives.142
On March 20, 1969, Chicano students began to walk out of their classes
after DPS officials failed to respond to their demands.143 The students,
along with community supporters, held a rally in a park across the street.144
Rodolfo Gonzales, in a speech, echoed the demonstrators theme: “The
young people demand an equal education, and they’re going to get it. These
teachers will have to start listening to the demands of our youth.”145 After
speeches from several student leaders and Chicano activists, the
demonstrators marched to nearby Baker Junior High School where others
joined in support.146 When the demonstrators continued their march back to
West High School, the student protesters and Chicano activists encountered
several units of the Denver Police Department.147
Once the demonstrators began marching up the front steps of West High
School, Denver Police “holding riot sticks across their chests . . . started
moving the crowd [and] . . . several small struggles broke out. Suddenly,
according to witnesses, the air was full of rocks and pop bottles.”148 The
Denver Police acted on the authority given to them in a recently legislated
Colorado campus disorder law and used mace and physical force to subdue
the crowd.149 At least twenty six people were arrested, two were
hospitalized, and several others were injured in the violent confrontation
between students, activists, and the police.150 Afterward, the demonstrators
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regrouped, their ranks bolstered by members of the Students for Democratic
Society (SDS) from the University of Colorado at Boulder, and protested at
City Hall and Denver police headquarters.151
The next day, the events of the previous day were repeated. An estimated
1,200 to 1,500 student demonstrators and political activists again
congregated at the school and rallied against unequal education and racial
discrimination at West High School.152 One placard held by a demonstrator
boldly declared: “Our Selma Is Here.”153 However, Denver’s “Selma”
reflected a racial complexity and racial coalition that did not exist in efforts
to desegregate southern public schools. As the West High School
demonstrators supported Chicano studies and bilingual education, many
Denver students believed that the culprit preventing true integration was the
educational policy that distinguished and segregated the city’s Chicano and
black students from their white peers.
Consequently, black students from Denver’s East and Manual High
Schools marched from their schools to West High School in support of the
Chicano student demands.154 One newspaper, with pictures of large groups
of black and Chicano students marching together, reported on the
multiracial dynamic in the struggle for educational equality in the city.155
According to the Denver Post, “[A]s helmeted officers wearing gas mask
containers and carrying riot sticks stood by, local Black Panther leader
Lauren Watson, told the crowd ‘this is a day of black and brown unity.’”156
The action of Chicano and black students and activists suggested that
integration in Denver needed to be understood in multiracial terms. One
student from East High School echoed the newly reoriented racial identities
that were at the heart of Denver’s school desegregation and integration
debate: “Black and white together is a bunch of bull . . . . We’re going to
sing black and brown together.”157
Similar to the struggle of black parents and students attempting to
achieve equality in their schools,158 the demands of Chicano students were
dismissed as the belligerent actions of a small minority. Indeed, the Rocky
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Mountain News, in an editorial condemning the violence, made the
following accusatory remarks: “NOBODY—MOST OF ALL the students
recruited into the demonstrations—seemed sure of what the rock throwing,
police-taunting fracas was all about . . . . This outburst was promoted by
people long past the high school age.”159 Despite the perceived sense of
unity among Denver’s black and brown students, the “West High
Blowouts”—as Chicano activists came to call the events—symbolized the
complex struggle for equality of educational opportunity and subsequent
multiracial fractures in Denver. One news report, for instance, noted that at
one point during the demonstrations, blacks and Chicanos argued about the
focus of the protest.160
Significantly, the discontent of the students did not just suddenly emerge.
As State Senator Roger Cisneros, of Denver, told the Denver Public School
Board, “The demands and aspirations are not the demands of a few
militants—but the demands of the entire Hispano community. The
dramatization last Thursday . . . said all the things we’ve been saying for the
past four or five years. But no one has been listening.”161 Integrationist
Denver Board of Education member A. Edgar Benton “was distressed that
some of the most influential Denverites he had been talking to about last
week’s violence at West seemed to feel the key issue was ‘how to get rid of
Corky Gonzales.’”162 Benton pointed out that “this viewpoint is patently
absurd on its face. Corky Gonzales is irrelevant to the problem at West
High School.”163 Instead, Benton implicated racial attitudes that permeated
throughout the city. He stated that “[t]he problem is in southeast Denver,
and East Denver, and other parts of the community wherever people
continue to rest on a lot of wrong assumptions about Mexican Americans.
One of those assumptions is that ‘the Mexican isn’t worth a damn and there
isn’t much that can be done about him.’”164 Benton articulated the reality
that in multiracial Denver, equality of education would not be accomplished
by any one means.165
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In the weeks and months that followed, DPS Superintendent Gilberts
answered the students’ demands. He promised to expand the teaching of
Chicano history, culture and language at West High School and other
Denver public schools; increase the Chicano studies collection in West’s
library; enlarge present elementary school foreign language programs; work
with parents, students, teachers, and activists to get each into a dialogue
regarding “the social and economic problems of the community surrounding
West High School”; serve Mexican food in the lunchroom; and continue
efforts to increase the number of Chicano teachers in the DPS.166 Although
Gilberts did not accede to all of the demands of Chicano youth, Rodolfo
Gonzales called the proposal “the greatest victory in the history of
Denver.”167 Moreover, later that summer, state legislators repealed a law
that banned teaching in any language other than English and enacted
another law providing for comprehensive bilingual and bicultural education
in the state’s public schools.168
There were, however, other developments that suggested a dramatic
retreat from efforts to provide educational equality in the Denver public
school system. In the spring of 1969, lawyer James Perrill and former state
senator and realtor Frank Southworth campaigned for two open seats on the
Denver School Board.169 One of the open seats belonged to integrationist
Benton.170 Perrill and Southworth exclusively campaigned on the premise
that Denver’s schools should not attempt to correct “all of the social ills of
the society,” promising to end the current Board’s policy of forced busing
and to repeal the integration resolutions if they were elected.171 In
commenting on the creative redundancy of Perrill and Southworth’s
message, one national observer stated that “[i]n their public appearances,
Perrill and Southworth mentioned crosstown busing, massive busing, and
massive crosstown busing. By the end of the campaign, Southworth was
talking about ‘forced mandatory crosstown busing on a massive scale.’”172
The strategy worked. In May of 1969, Perrill and Southworth won in a
landslide victory.173 Importantly, Perrill and Southworth’s opponents “lost
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soundly in the Anglo sections of Denver. They even lost the white areas
that would not have been touched by the busing plan.”174 Consequently,
Perrill and Southworth spearheaded the rescission of the integration
resolutions at the meeting of the new board on June 9, 1969.175 As a result,
the newly constituted anti-busing board enacted Resolution 1533 and
reinstated the previous voluntary open enrollment plan of the Denver Public
Schools.176 Ten days later, on June 19, 1969, a group of black, Hispano,
and white parents and their children filed suit against the Denver Public
School Board and its administration in the United States District Court,
Colorado, for maintaining a policy of intentional segregation of the
district’s diverse student body.177
Less than a week after Chicano students at West High School became
involved in violent confrontations with the Denver Police Department and
within months of the newly reconstituted DPS Board’s decision to rescind
its integration policies, Dwight D. Eisenhower passed away.178 For many, it
was the end of a seemingly simpler, nobler, and purer time in American
society.179 For others, however, it was the continuation of a culture of
racism and discrimination that had barely changed since the Supreme
Court’s apparent rejection of such thinking in Brown v. Board of Education
in 1954.180 Tellingly, the Denver Post’s editorial tribute to Eisenhower was
surrounded by editorial reactions to the “racial confrontation” at West High
School and racial segregation in American society.181 According to one of
the accounts, “five years ago a demonstration the size of the one at West
would have been inconceivable for the Denver area . . . . Why the change?
Because the Denver area leaders have chosen to attack isolated problems . .
. rather than concentrate on basic issues of human dignity.”182 Indeed, only
twelve years removed from President Eisenhower’s reluctant decision to use
the National Guard to enforce a federal court’s order to integrate a high
school in Little Rock, Arkansas,183 the Denver Public School Board openly
rejected the “human dignity” aspirations behind the effort to provide equal
education in the city’s schools. In the aftermath of Perrill’s and
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Southworth’s elections, one Denverite noted that “[a]s a black citizen, I’m
not so sure South Denver does not really look like Little Rock.”184
In contrast to school desegregation in the American South, the terms,
conditions, and meaning of integration were dramatically different in this
western city. The Denver Public School District attempted to balance the
concerns of all of these groups by a variety of means. The philosophy of
cultural pluralism, the adherence to a policy of neighborhood schools, and
grudging acknowledgment of racial imbalance all amounted to the inability
of the DPS to come to grips with racial inequality in its schools. Given
such contradictory policies, racial discrimination in Denver’s public schools
seemed too disconnected and disparate for many in the Denver community.
Moreover, the multiple, and at times conflicting, positions of Denver’s
black, Chicano, and white communities in how Denver schools should
implement integration only obscured many of the core issues.
The Denver Public School Board’s ambivalence regarding these issues
put into sharp relief the importance of racial difference and antagonism in
Denver. For African Americans and Mexican Americans, in particular, the
DPS Board’s vote to reverse its position on integration further reinforced
Mexican and African Americans’ belief that they were not full and equal
metropolitan citizens. In response, one integration activist declared, “We’re
going to probe, lobby, protest, embarrass, enjoin, and whatever else is
legally available to accomplish our aims.”185 The Keyes complaint
represented the centerpiece of such an endeavor. For many, this litigation
against the Denver School Board served as a litmus test to spell out clearly
and define what equality, fairness, and justice meant for black, Chicano, and
white parents and students.

IV. RACE MAKING, EQUALITY JURISPRUDENCE, AND THE
DESEGREGATION OF AMERICAN SCHOOLS
On July 16, 1969, Judge William Doyle of the United States District
Court, Colorado, held the first of many hearings in Keyes v. School District

VOLUME 3 • ISSUE 1 • 2004

98

SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

Number One.186 Of the 96,000 students who attended Denver’s public
schools, 66 percent were Anglo, 20 percent Hispano, and 14 percent
Black.187 Despite being the smallest minority group in the school system,
black parents and activists, mobilized by nearly a decade of adverse school
board decisions, took the lead in pursuing litigation after the School Board
voted to rescind its integration policies.188 Accordingly, the complaint
asked the court to consider whether the “use of various techniques such as
the manipulation of student attendance zones, school site selection, and a
neighborhood school policy, created or maintained racially or ethnically (or
both racially and ethnically) segregated schools throughout the school
district, entitling the plaintiffs to a decree directing desegregation of the
entire school district.”189
Over the following six-day hearing, Judge Doyle considered the
plaintiffs’ motion to enjoin the School Board from rescinding the School
District’s integration plan.190 In his written opinion, Judge Doyle made it
clear that in “any case involving discrimination in public schools,” the
Constitution’s equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was
“designed to protect fundamental rights, not only of the majority but of
minorities as well, even against the will of the majority. The effort to
accommodate community sentiment or the wishes of the majority of voters .
. . cannot justify abandonment of our Constitution.”191
The issues in the case, however, very quickly revealed the problems of
applying the Constitution to populations where the question of “majority”
and “minority” were not so clear. Although federal courts had long
recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment was not subject to a “two-class”
theory of protection, there was little jurisprudence in 1969 that spoke to the
ways in which the law balanced the varied and often competing interests of
a multiracial population.192 As Harvard Professor Christopher Jencks
remarked at the time, “Denver will have to redraw its zones in such a way
as to offset the effects of neighborhood segregation and produce racially
mixed schools.”193
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However, courts were confronted with the question of what the meaning
of “racially mixed” legally entailed in a city not split between black and
white lines. In answering this question, Justice Brennan of the United
States Supreme Court in 1973 summarized the legal dilemma facing the
federal courts, “Denver is tri-ethnic, as distinguished from a bi-racial
community. . . . [Thus,] [s]hould Negroes and Hispanos . . . be placed in the
same category to establish the segregated character of a school?”194 The
resolution of this question and the subsequent application of a desegregation
remedy to the Denver Public School system highlighted the challenges of
integrating a tri-ethnic student body.
A. Multiracial Categories and American Law: A Brief Overview
Beginning in the second half of the nineteenth century, American courts
encountered great difficulties incorporating non-white and non-black groups
into American law.195 As Ian Haney-López demonstrated, the most
extended legal and jurisprudential discussion regarding the racial positions
of these groups occurred in relation to naturalization prerequisite cases.196
Of the fifty-one cases decided by federal courts between 1878 and 1952, a
majority took place in jurisdictions in the American West and involved the
racial status of Chinese, Japanese, Hawaiians, Burmese, Mexicans, Native
Americans, Asian Indians, Syrians, Armenians, Filipinos, Punjabis, and
Afghanis.197 In these cases, courts used common knowledge, contemporary
science, congressional intent, and legal precedent to find each of these
groups non-white and, in turn, to deny most of these petitioners’
naturalization claims.198
However, one of the few exceptions involved the claim of a “pureblooded Mexican” in 1897.199 In In re Rodriguez, the federal district court
in Texas allowed a Mexican petitioner to become a citizen, although “if
strict scientific classification of the anthropologist . . . [were] adopted, he
would probably not be classed as [W]hite.”200 Over thirty years later, the
United States Supreme Court contributed to further confusion by declaring
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that “[w]hether a person of [Mexican] descent may be naturalized in the
United States is still an unsettled question.”201
Rather than clarify any ambiguity regarding the meaning of “whiteness”
in such jurisprudence, courts instead assumed the whiteness and blackness
of various groups. For example, in Gong Lum v. Rice in 1927, the Supreme
Court did not question the state of Mississippi’s decision to classify a
“Chinese citizen of the United States . . . among the colored races.”202
Although the Gong Lum opinion specifically indicated that a “white, brown,
yellow, or black” racial typography existed, it did not provide any hard-andfast constitutional rules for determining multiracial rights.203 Instead, the
Supreme Court reinforced the “colored” and “non-colored” distinction
found in Mississippi’s state law.204 As in the naturalization cases, however,
the racial status of Mexican Americans proved troublesome for the nation’s
racial constitutional jurisprudence.
By the late nineteenth century, Mexican American litigants, in particular,
found themselves arguing two related types of constitutional issues that
were also common among African Americans: the exclusion of Mexican
Americans from juries; and the segregation of Mexican Americans in jury
pools, public schools, and public accommodations.205 By the early
twentieth century, however, the racial status of Mexican Americans in
constitutional cases rejected any similarities to the nation’s black
community.206
In Texas, for example, Clare Sheridan has shown that prior to the 1950s,
state courts repeatedly held that “Mexicans were part of the white race, and,
therefore, as whites, they were not discriminated against when juries were
constituted solely of whites.”207 Although Mexican Americans were
socially and politically treated as non-white in places like California and
Texas, courts maintained the fiction that they were white in the eyes of the
law.208
Such cases were based on two arguments. First, state courts throughout
the American West continued to argue that the Fourteenth Amendment was
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based on a two-class theory of race that applied only to white discrimination
against non-whites.209 In 1937, the Colorado Supreme Court followed this
rationale by holding that a “White Trade Only” sign hung on the outside of
a quasi-public pool did not apply to plaintiffs of Spanish descent.210
According to the Supreme Court of Colorado, the sign, even “in its [most]
offensive sense, was without application to [the Spanish] petitioners.”211
However, despite evidence that the pool’s proprietors discriminated against
“Spanish Americans,” the court refused to hear their claim.212
The second argument assumed that even if Mexican Americans were
discriminated against, they as a group were a nationality subject to a lower
degree of constitutional protection.213 In this line of reasoning, “‘nationality
groups’ did not carry the same constitutional meaning as racial groups . . .
and because Mexicans were a nationality group, the equal protection clause
did not apply to them.”214 Although the Supreme Court suggested in Yick
Wo v. Hopkins in 1887 that race and nationality were on equal footing, the
whiteness and non-Americaness of Mexican Americans prevented them
from being successful in many of their Fourteenth Amendment claims.215
In some cases, the whiteness of Mexican Americans proved an asset. For
instance, the first court-ordered school desegregation case in the United
States involved Mexican Americans in the multiracial West.216 In 1931, a
county court in California evaluated the decision of a local school board to
build a Mexican school based on state law that permitted the segregation of
African and American Indian students.217 The county court held that
Mexican Americans did not fall under the rubric of either of these racial
designations and as a result, invalidated the school board’s decision.218 In
other cases, however, the two-class and nationality theories of
discrimination, especially in Texas, allowed courts to consistently uphold
the segregation of Mexican Americans from other whites.219 In such cases,
courts held that migrant work patterns, English-language deficiencies, and
the need to “Americanize” Mexican students justified segregation.220
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In 1947 and 1954, two cases disrupted the racial and nationality
limitations applied to Mexican Americans in Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence. The first was when the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in
Westminster School District of Orange County v. Mendez, upheld the
decision of a California federal district court to invalidate one school
district’s policy to segregate Mexican students.221 Although both the trial
court and the appellate court noted that none of the parties to the case made
a claim of racial discrimination, the Ninth Circuit nonetheless briefly
assessed the racial dynamics of the case.222 The Ninth Circuit noted that all
school segregation jurisprudence written by state and federal courts
included “only children of parents belonging to one or another of the great
races of mankind.”223 To further elaborate what these races were, the court
stated the following:
Somewhat empirically, it used to be taught that mankind was made
up of white, brown, yellow, black and red men. Such divisional
designation has little or no adherents among anthropologists or
ethnic scientists. A more scholarly nomenclature is Caucasoid,
Mongoloid, and Negroid, yet this is unsatisfactory, as an attempt to
collectively sort all mankind into distinct [racial] groups.224
The court’s inability to arrive at a satisfactory definition of race indicated
the racial ambiguity of the Mexican American litigants in the case. Indeed,
the court’s unwillingness to defer to scholarly nomenclature suggested that
the Ninth Circuit may have considered Mexicans as their own specific racial
group.
The Ninth Circuit, however, never had to address this issue because
California law already specifically distinguished separate Indian, Chinese,
Japanese, and Mongolian schools.225 Thus, because the Mexican American
students did not belong to any of these groups, the Ninth Circuit held that
the school board’s segregation policies were arbitrarily applied and, thus,
violated the Fourteenth Amendment.226 While neither the Ninth Circuit, nor
the parties to the case settled the issue of the racial status of Mexican
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Americans, the Mendez decision made it clear that Mexcian Americans
could not be lumped together with these non-white groups.227
In the second case occurring in 1954, the United States Supreme Court,
in Hernández v. Texas, addressed the long-standing exclusion of Mexican
Americans from juries in Texas.228 The Court rejected arguments that had
been historically used by Texas courts to deny “Mexican Americans”
constitutional protections.229 According to the decision’s architect, Chief
Justice Earl Warren, “The Fourteenth Amendment is not directed solely
against discrimination due to a ‘two-class theory’—that is, based upon
differences between ‘white’ and Negro.”230 Instead, Warren argued that
“community prejudices are not static, and from time to time other
differences from the community norm may define other groups which need
the same protection. Whether such a group exists within a community is a
question of fact.”231 In asking whether a Fourteenth Amendment violation
had been committed, the Supreme Court seemingly suggested that the
relevant inquiry was not whether Mexicans were a racial nationality group,
but whether Mexicans were part of a class that had been arbitrarily denied
constitutional rights.232 Although Justice Warren declined to address
explicitly the racial and national implications of the decision, Hernández’s
own lawyers saw Mexican Americans as “another white race” that merited
Fourteenth Amendment protection.233
Importantly, 1954 was also the year that the United States Supreme Court
wrote its opinion in Brown v. Board of Education.234 As the named case of
four consolidated cases, Brown’s fact patterns in Kansas took place on the
periphery of the multiracial American West. Yet, the region’s racial
diversity played no role in its disposition. Indeed, neither the parties, nor
the amici, nor the authors in Brown cited Mexican American school
desegregation in the American West at any stage in the case, even though
the Supreme Court decided Brown a mere twelve days after it decided
Hernández.235
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Despite the failure to connect racial school segregation and
discriminatory jury selection in the “multi-class” West, the Court’s 1954
Hernández and Brown cases nevertheless indicated the inability of the
Supreme Court to imagine a multiracial United States. As one study noted,
“the Court was considering the issues of Latino [racial identity] and of
school desegregation concurrently. Because the Court carefully dodged the
question of Latinos’ racial identity in Hernández . . . it is not surprising that
the Court did not address the question of Latino school segregation in
Brown. After all, Brown occurred within the familiar black-white
binary.”236 In this binary, the constitutional presumption was that Mexican
Americans were white, even if they were “another white race.”
Although the color line played very different roles in Brown and
Hernández, each case highlighted the centrality as well as the ambiguity of
race in constitutional jurisprudence. The American West’s Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence demonstrated that legal and social distinctions
and categories were not static but were subject to rapid change and
contradiction. Ironically, however, jurisprudence, particularly the Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence that commented on the rights of non-white and nonblack groups, only reinforced the binary of race and color in constitutional
law, rather than disrupting it. Indeed, it would be over a decade before nonblack groups, including Mexican Americans and Asian Americans and
Pacific Islanders in the American West, utilized the presumptions of racial
inferiority established in Brown to challenge segregation of these same
groups.237 In such litigation, Mexican American activists, no longer argued
that they were another white race.238 On the other hand, as the battle to
integrate Denver’s schools demonstrated, Mexican Americans did not view
themselves as another black race.239 At the time that Keyes was filed, courts
and other governmental institutions were only beginning to consider the
meaning of race in a multi-class environment.240 While constitutional
jurisprudence indicated a color spectrum between whites and blacks, it did
not anticipate many of the problems that would arise when the facts of the
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case did not fit racial preconceptions and prescriptions forged in a racially
binary legal world.
B. The Legal Boundaries of Inequality and Chicano/a Identity
At the time that the black, Chicano, and white students filed their case in
Denver in 1969, there were no reported school desegregation cases that
specifically involved representatives from all three groups. Nevertheless,
the complaint argued that “Negro and Hispano children residing in the
School District” were not receiving the same “educational opportunities,
advantages, and facilities afforded and available to Anglo children of public
school age similarly situated in the School District.”241 Although the
plaintiffs’ complaint left open the question of whether such practices were
the result of discrimination based on “race, color, or ethnicity,” the
complaint alleged that the principles of equality in Brown had been
violated.242 In contrast to Brown, however, the issue of equality in Denver
literally could not be understood in only black and white terms.
Accordingly, the complaint asked the court to determine whether the
policies and practices of the DPS system failed to prepare practically the
district’s white, black, and Chicano students to live in a multiracial world.243
Despite the multiracial school system described in the complaint, the
plaintiffs constructed their argument in a dual-system, “minority/majority”
framework.244 During the testimony of the preliminary injunction hearing
in July of 1969 and the trial on the merits in the spring of 1970, the
plaintiffs posed the constitutional violation as one that had been inflicted by
a white majority upon the School District’s Chicano and black minorities
together.245 For this reason, the plaintiffs’ legal team argued for systemwide integration.246
As Judge Doyle pointed out, a threshold problem in evaluating a
constitutional remedy “[was] a definition of segregation.”247 For Judge
Doyle, segregation did not only revolve around the “heavy concentration of
a minority group,”248 it also involved the “racial and ethnic composition of
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faculty and staff, [the] equality of educational opportunity offered at the
school,” the community attitudes towards the school, and most importantly,
the explicit acts of a school board and its administration in creating such
conditions.249
Outside of the schools in one particular racially concentrated
neighborhood, the relationship of all of these issues seemed harder to
connect. To frame their case in relation to the entire school system, the
plaintiffs identified “core city” schools that had large concentrations of
black and /or Chicano students, faculty and staff.250 Rather than describe
discernable differences among the educational experiences and the
integration remedies of these minority students, the plaintiffs instead
introduced evidence that explained how each group, both individually and
collectively, had been denied the equality of an educational opportunity.251
Such evidence included reports and studies that concluded Denver’s corecity black and Chicano schools tended to have: “(1) low average scholastic
achievement; (2) less experienced teachers; (3) higher rates of teacher
turnover; (4) higher dropout rates; and (5) older buildings and smaller
sites.”252
The discriminatory acts of the School Board and DPS Administration
regarding these schools, however, were more difficult to prove. According
to Superintendent Kenneth Oberholtzer, the conditions at such schools were
not the result of any explicit or tacit desire of the School Board or the
administration to discriminate against minority students.253
Rather,
Oberholtzer argued that poor student achievement at such schools was the
result of “[a person’s] home environment, his mother and dad, his sisters
and brothers, [and] the neighborhood in which he grows up and becomes a
person.”254
The School District’s desire to explain school desegregation as the
product of the Chicano and black condition did not carry much weight.
Instead, Judge Doyle found that the DPS had a policy of willful ignorance
in relation to such schools.255 Although Judge Doyle pointed out that “the
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Board’s eye-closing and head-burying” regarding such schools “normally is
not the kind of conduct” reached by the Fourteenth Amendment
desegregation jurisprudence,256 he nevertheless decided that the
Constitution could not ignore the “relationship between racial
concentration” in Denver’s core-city schools and “inferiority in
achievement and low standards and consequently low morale” among the
multiracial students.257 The question remained, however, what did “racial
concentration” mean in a case involving Hispano, Negro, and Anglo
students?
The plaintiffs’ legal team argued that Denver schools were segregated if
they had large concentrations of Negro and/or Hispano students.258
Accordingly, counsel for the plaintiffs targeted twenty-five schools that had
a racial concentration of Chicano and African American students. While
some schools had undeniable concentrations of Chicano and African
American students, the racial concentration of other schools required a more
complicated analysis.259 The plaintiffs recognized that a minority and
therefore unequal school in Denver would not appear as segregated if
Chicano or African American students were counted separately.260
Moreover, in many such core-city schools, separately counting these
minority students would give the appearance of an integrated school district
if the court considered Chicanos to be just another white race.261
Judge Doyle was not prepared to agree that African American and
Chicano students should be counted together.262 As Judge Doyle pointed
out, the plaintiffs’ attempts to “place Hispanos as well as Negroes . . . all in
one category and [to] utilize the total number as establishing the segregated
character of the school . . . is often an over-simplification, . . . and [to] lump
them into a single minority category . . . remains a problem and
question.”263
Although Judge Doyle, who was influenced by his
understanding of Denver and its group politics, conceded that African
American and Chicano people shared economic and cultural deprivation
and discrimination, he observed that “Hispanos have a wholly different
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origin, and the problems applicable to them are often different.”264
Accordingly, the different histories and obstacles of African Americans and
Chicanos posed problems over what actually constituted a segregated or
racially imbalanced school.
Rather than engaging in a long and inconsistent discourse of racial and
ethnic differences in American constitutional jurisprudence, Judge Doyle
simply noted that the mission of the federal courts in school desegregation
cases was to determine the “inequality based upon race or ethnic origin.”265
Consequently, Judge Doyle’s opinion suggested that there was no need to
distinguish between racial or ethnic discrimination in terms of school
desegregation litigation. Judge Doyle opined that to “the extent that
Hispanos, as a group, are isolated in concentrated numbers,” such schools
are “segregated.”266 Thus, Judge Doyle found that a “concentration of
either African American or Chicano students constituting approximately 70
to 75 percent of the school’s general population was a school likely to
produce the kind of inferiority with which the courts were concerned.“267
Applying this formula to each school, Judge Doyle found that fifteen of
the twenty-five schools identified by the plaintiffs separately denied African
American and Chicano students equal educational opportunity, and as a
result, these minority-concentrated schools were subject to a school
desegregation order.268 Judge Doyle ordered these schools to improve their
faculty, to institute a voluntary transfer policy out of “inferior schools to
good schools,” to initiate limited busing to integrate the core-city and Park
Hill schools with minority concentrations, and to offer compensatory
education, including “human relations training, Spanish training, and
classes in Negro and Hispano culture and history.”269
In addition, the court determined that such schools would be integrated
when each “has an Anglo composition in excess of 50 percent.”270 Judge
Doyle further outlined his vision for the remaining 50 percent: “Although it
is probably not constitutionally required, the desirability of having the
minority student population in each of these schools apportioned equally
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between Negro and Hispano children is apparent.”271 Despite Judge
Doyle’s conviction that Chicano and black students could not be counted
together, he described the so-called “minority factor” that exacerbated the
problem of racial concentration.272 Judge Doyle noted that “the minority
citizens are products, in many instances, of parents who received inferior
educations and hence the home environment, which is looked to for many
fundamental sources of learning and knowledge, yields virtually no
educational value.”273 In Judge Doyle’s opinion, the only hope was
bringing Denver’s Hispano and Negro citizens into contact with
knowledgeable Anglos.274
Judge Doyle’s early disposition of the multiple issues in Keyes
highlighted an already muddled understanding of racial difference in
American law and jurisprudence.275 Although Judge Doyle did not have a
body of multiracial understanding in the law at his disposal to use for
consistency or to justify his decision to apportion rights among the Denver
School District’s many groups, he was not the only jurist to have such a first
impression of the multiracial interests at stake.
In south Texas, for instance, the legal effort to desegregate one urban
school district demonstrated an emerging awareness of the multiracial
interests involved in the nation’s constitutional jurisprudence.276 The case
Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent School District277 challenged the
maintenance of a dual school system erected against Mexican American and
black students in the Corpus Christi Independent School District.278 As a
result, Cisneros provided another way that American courts have attempted
to reconcile race and rights among a racially diverse student body. On June
4, 1970, Judge Woodrow Seals issued his opinion.279 The court confronted
the question of whether Brown and its progeny applied to Mexican
Americans, and if so, what constituted a segregated school when Negroes
and Anglos were also involved?280
Like Judge Doyle’s opinion, Judge Seals’s opinion is not consistent in its
use of racial and ethnic terminology. Moreover, Judge Seals argued that
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such terms were subject to change and redefinition over time and that all
group identification labels such as Chicano, black, and, even the term
“ethnic-minority,” were misnomers dependent upon variances in time,
place, and context.281 In one footnote, Judge Seals explained: “The court
used the term ‘minority’ simply because the case involves ethnic groups
that are numerically in the minority. Nationally, Mexican American and
Negro populations are decidedly in the minority . . . . The court recognized
that either group may represent a majority in the United States at some time
in the future.”282 Because Judge Seals was convinced that racial or ethnic
misidentification limited the constitutional analysis, he indicated that a
court needed to closely analyze a city’s history in order to determine if
various groups, particularly Mexican Americans, were disadvantaged in
ways that denied them constitutional rights.283 Such evidence revealed that
in Corpus Christi, as in Denver, racial discrimination did not easily split
between black and white lines.
To determine the constitutional remedy for the Mexican American and
African American students, Judge Seals argued that “the constitutional
inquiry is concerned with whether a particular disadvantaged group is being
substantially segregated from the more advantaged group. . . . The
constitutional ill is not cured simply by commingling two similarly
disadvantaged groups (the Negroes and the Mexican Americans), both of
which are substantially segregated from the more advantaged group, which
in this case is the Anglo American population.”284 As a result, Judge Seals
indicated that Mexican American and black students should not be counted
separately. Because Mexican American and black students had educational
experiences that were inferior to the educational experiences of white
students, Judge Seals held the entire Corpus Christi school system
unconstitutionally segregated regardless of the racial concentration in a few
particular schools.285 His order included not only a plan for limited busing,
but also the creation of a “human relations commission” that had equal
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membership from the city’s Mexican American, African American, and
Anglo groups.286
Despite important analytical differences, both Judge Doyle’s and Judge
Seals’s opinions ultimately recognized the social complexity of
constitutional rights brought before the courts. In their separate ways, both
judges recognized the challenges of determining rights outside the familiar
black and white binary. While Judge Doyle believed it was necessary that
either black or Mexican Americans represent an overwhelming majority of
students to determine the segregated nature of a school, Judge Seals was not
prepared to constitutionally count separately Mexican American and black
students.
As a result, these two opinions demonstrated two very different visions of
court-ordered desegregation in multiracial cities like Denver and Corpus
Christi. Courts could examine segregation on a school-by-school racial
analysis, or they could presume that the system-wide disadvantages
extended to all non-white groups. Although he ultimately concluded that
Corpus Christi’s Mexican American and black students suffered similar
inequalities when compared to white students, Judge Seals remarked: “We
are not a homogeneous people; we are a heterogeneous people; we have
many races, many religions, many colors in America.”287 Indeed, the very
different needs and issues impacting multiracial groups in the United States
invariably indicated that no single desegregation remedy would suffice.
C. From Theory to Application: Creating a Meaningful National Standard
of Multiracial Equality
The months leading up to Judge Doyle’s rulings demonstrated just how
complicated and fractured racial tensions had become in the Denver area.
In February 1970, twenty-three Denver Public School buses were destroyed
and fifteen were damaged by dynamite.288 In that same year, Judge Doyle’s
house was bombed.289 An editorial in one local newspaper highlighted the
ways that Denverites might assign blame:
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The Denver school buses were bombed and burned. How awful!
Your first thought might be that the white racist segregationists
who have fought busing for so long might be at fault. . . . Next,
your thoughts might turn to blacks who have had bad experiences
with integration and have become disillusioned. Your thoughts
[might then] turn to the Mexican-American community.290
Rather than apportion responsibility among Denver’s multiracial groups,
however, the editorial further noted that such acts have “been done even in
Denver, and if you look around you, it is being done over and over again
throughout the United States.”291 It was becoming apparent that the issue of
equality and the multiracial battle for civil rights was not unique to Denver.
Accordingly, the Keyes case took on heightened significance for the manner
by which the court would balance all of the competing multiracial interests.
At the center of the issue was the extent to which the experiences of
multiracial groups were fundamentally the same. In their brief to the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals, the plaintiffs in Keyes challenged the separation
of Hispanos and Negroes in Judge Doyle’s remedy by arguing that the trial
court, “for the first time as a principle in constitutional law,” established
“that segregation exists only when it is of one race at a time . . . . The
precedent, . . . if allowed to stand, would have broad restrictive application
in cities all over the country.”292 Simply put, the plaintiffs asked whether
the effects of discrimination for different minority groups were the same,
and if not, what were the implications of requiring a separate determination
of inequality for Mexican Americans as opposed to blacks and other
disadvantaged groups?
In their decision, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals indirectly addressed
the plaintiffs’ argument by affirming Judge Doyle’s ruling with respect to
black schools in one Denver neighborhood, but the court reversed his ruling
with respect to the Hispano and black core-city schools.293 According to the
Tenth Circuit, Denver Public School Board discrimination concerning
concentrated African American schools did not create a presumption of
unconstitutionality in the entire school district of concentrated black or
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Mexican American schools.294 Because of the Tenth Circuit’s belief that
the concentration of African American and Chicano students in the core-city
was the result of race-neutral polices,295 the court indicated the extent to
which that racial animus had to be specifically proven by either one of these
groups.296 Although black and Chicano students were individually and
collectively concentrated in core-city schools, the various, and at times
differing, positions taken by the DPS Board and its administration toward
these two communities obscured the nature of the racial discrimination
throughout the entire district.
The Keyes plaintiffs filed a writ of certiorari to the United States
Supreme court to review the Tenth Circuit’s final judgment and opinion.297
In opposition to the writ, the DPS legal team argued that the “case has no
significant national implications . . . largely because . . . [the] facts . . . vary
from district to district.”298 Such facts included Denver’s social and
neighborhood distribution along African American, Chicano, and Anglo
lines. The emergence of Mexican Americans and other ethnic minorities in
school desegregation jurisprudence, however, compelled the Supreme Court
to reject such reasoning.299 The court heard oral arguments in October 1972
and made their decision in June 1973.300
For the first time in its post-Brown school desegregation jurisprudence,
the Supreme Court did not deliver a unanimous ruling in the case.301
Instead, the Supreme Court was sharply divided over the extent that
constitutionally permitted segregation had taken place “in a school district
the size of Denver’s.”302 Part of the Court’s division rested on the degree to
which constitutionally impermissible discrimination could be inferred
outside of a black and white social context.303 Justice Brennan’s majority
opinion confronted this decision early when he declared: “Unlike cities in
the American South, Denver is tri-ethnic, as distinguished from a bi-racial,
community.”304 Justice Brennan assessed the usefulness of Judge Doyle’s
decision not to count Negroes and Hispanos together in order “to establish
the segregated character of a school.”305
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Justice Brennan’s analysis of this issue did not rely on evidence showing
that Hispano and black schools in Denver were inferior to Anglo schools.
Instead, Justice Brennan utilized a series of late 1960s and early 1970s
United States Commission on Civil Rights (USCCR) studies on the
experiences of Mexican American students in the states of Arizona,
California, Colorado, New Mexico, and Texas.306 The studies found
widespread social and cultural segregation of Mexican American students
throughout the school districts of these states.307
In evaluating the findings of the USCCR on Mexican Americans, Justice
Brennan repositioned the racial stance of Mexican Americans in
constitutional law. Citing Hernández, Justice Brennan unambiguously
indicated that “Hispanos constitute an identifiable class for purposes of the
Fourteenth Amendment.”308
Justice Brennan’s analysis, however,
suggested that this class could not be considered another white group;
instead, he stated that there was “much evidence that in the Southwest,
Hispanos and Negroes have a great many things in common.”309 Most
importantly, according to Justice Brennan, “Negroes and Hispanos in
Denver suffer identical discrimination in treatment when compared with the
treatment afforded Anglo students.”310 This conclusion allowed Justice
Brennan and the majority of the United States Supreme Court to argue that
discrimination against one non-white group, of which Hispanos were now a
part, created a presumption of discrimination against other non-white
groups in tri-ethnic Denver.311 Although such reasoning allowed the
Supreme Court to have a more expansive definition of racial discrimination
in a rapidly transforming and heterogeneous United States, it collapsed
important differences between racialized groups around a color line.
Particularly for Denver’s Chicano and black student bodies, it invariably
complicated any attempt to provide an effective and multifaceted remedy.
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D. Busing, Bilingual-Bicultural Education, and the Legal Limits of Equal
Protection
In responding to the Supreme Court’s disposition of Keyes, Judge Doyle
ordered the DPS Board to desegregate the entire school system “root and
branch.” 312 Accordingly, Judge Doyle worked to fashion a remedy that
addressed the unique needs of Denver’s tri-ethnic student population.313 In
his desegregation plan, Judge Doyle not only ordered a traditional busing
remedy, but on the recommendation of the Mexican American Legal
Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF), he ordered the adoption of a
bilingual and multicultural plan instead of “racial balancing” in certain
schools.314
Significantly, MALDEF did not join the litigation until after the United
States Supreme Court made its 1973 decision.315 For Chicano educators
and parents, Justice Brennan’s recognition of Denver as a tri-ethnic city
indicated the need for Mexican American students to have their own
advocate in the case.316 Thus, MALDEF took a position that racially
juxtaposed Chicano students with blacks and whites. According to
MALDEF, the Keyes plaintiffs, “who [were] primarily black, and their
counsel lack[ed] exposure to the diverse problems that confront[ed] the
Chicano community.”317 Although both Justice Brennan and the United
States Commission on Civil Rights argued that blacks and Hispanos shared
similar discriminatory treatment, MALDEF argued that the competing
interests and the different needs of the two communities mandated that
Chicanos, as their own racially categorized group, have their own distinct
interests represented.318
According to MALDEF, the “issues presented to the Court have clearly
been black- dominated.”319 Similarly, MALDEF noted that “Chicanos
cannot be counted as whites for any purpose” in school desegregation.320 In
the words of MALDEF, as a non-white and non-black group, Chicano
students and their distinct racial interests promised to cause a
metamorphosis in constitutional law—one in which the distinct racial rights
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of Chicanos needed to be recognized and incorporated into the legal
analysis and remedy.321 As a consequence, MALDEF created its own
integration policy to specifically protect the needs of the Mexican American
students. The MALDEF proposal, known as the “Cardeñas Plan,”
represented the spirit of the Mexican American students, parents, and
activists who opposed large-scale busing and supported neighborhood
schools.322 Through its provisions for the teaching of Chicano studies as
well as the implementation of a comprehensive bilingual educational
program, the Cardeñas Plan attempted to institutionalize, at the
constitutional level, many of the same integration demands made by
Denver’s Chicano and other non-white students when they walked out of
their schools in 1969.323
As a result, the Cardeñas Plan attempted to chart the distinct needs of
Chicano students who would be most burdened by traditional bi-racial
desegregation remedies. As MALDEF noted that “the burden of busing at
the high school level is placed upon minority students. Although minorities
constitute only one-third of the [DPS’s] high school students, minorities
will comprise more than three out of every four high school students bused
from satellite areas to main attendance areas.”324 Thus, the Cardeñas Plan
submitted by MALDEF contemplated desegregation in terms that were very
different than the racial balance philosophy advocated by the courts.
At the center of the Cardeñas Plan rested a commitment to bilingual and
multicultural programs at every level of the school system.325 According to
MALDEF and Dr. Cardeñas, such programs positively and effectively
fostered a social identity that they hoped would develop a wholesome
respect for the intrinsic worth of every individual.326 In crafting such a
plan, MALDEF and Dr. Cardeñas reimagined a new role for cultural
pluralism in not only the educational process, but also in combating racial
inequality. In this sense, cultural pluralism did not mean “Chicano History
Week” or a section of the semester devoted to multiracial issues. Rather,
the Cardeñas Plan contemplated a complete re-centering of the educational
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process from history and music courses to language instruction and
economic education that would integrate the Chicano student into a
multicultural and multiracial American society.
In addition, the Cardeñas Plan, which was ultimately accepted by Judge
Doyle, rejected one of the major premises of school desegregation
litigation—the idea that white students and their culture would lift minority
students out of poverty, indifference, and inferiority.327 Instead, the
Cardeñas Plan advocated that the equality interests of the Chicano students
would be best served by allowing them to learn about, identify with, and
eventually emulate and celebrate their own racial and cultural heroes.328 In
these terms, integration into American society meant a legal and social
recognition of Chicanos as a distinct and separate racial group apart from
the nation’s black and white communities.
Perhaps the greatest indicator of the extent of the strength of MALDEF’s
argument is reflected in Judge Doyle’s own changing terminology in the
case. No longer referring to Mexican American students as “Hispanos” in
his decisions after 1973, Judge Doyle believed that the Cardeñas Plan
“[was] particularly appropriate for the Denver school system because of the
[C]ity and the region’s long tradition of Mexican and Chicano
influences.”329 In adopting the Cardeñas Plan and responding directly to the
unique needs and historical experiences of Chicano students and their
parents, Judge Doyle held strongly to his original ruling that African
American and Chicano school segregation was different.330 Judge Doyle’s
change in terminology suggested a new understanding of multiracial
differences in desegregation litigation and constitutional law.
His
multifaceted remedy contemplated the possibility that a constitutional
remedy appropriate to one racial group may not be as effective when
applied to another racial group. The Cardeñas Plan recognized an
opposition of interests between non-white groups, even though their
racialized experiences produced similar results.
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Judge Doyle’s attempt to provide a truly tri-ethnic remedy was
challenged and immediately appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals.331 Not surprisingly, the Cardeñas Plan was a highly contentious
issue. For instance, the Colorado State Board of Education charged that
“the process of desegregation [was] explicitly subordinated to the bilingualbicultural program. The Cardeñas [P]lan . . . can be viewed as fostering a
dual system—one for Chicanos and one for Anglos.”332 Indeed, the
Colorado State Board of Education categorically rejected cultural pluralism
in its schools because it would “force the philosophical and sociological
principles of one group upon all the people of the [s]tate of Colorado.”333
Once a viable solution to racial and ethnic tension in schools, cultural
pluralism, as defined by MALDEF and Dr. Cardeñas, became an
“ostensibly utopia-seeking” solution.334 The Cardeñas Plan was even
challenged by the Keyes plaintiffs. According to their counsel, Gordon
Griener, “the trial court has concluded . . . that it is constitutionally
permissible to substitute bilingual programs for desegregation.”335
Although the Keyes plaintiffs had asked for a remedy that prepared Denver
students to “live in a multiracial world,”336 they were not prepared to
abrogate either the definition of integration or an appropriate response to
such an end.
Such arguments carried quite a bit of weight and the Tenth Circuit
rejected the Cardeñas Plan as an appropriate desegregation remedy.337 The
court noted that the Cardeñas Plan “requires an overhaul of the system’s
entire approach to the education of minorities; its proposals extend to
matters of educational philosophy, governance, instructional scope and
sequence, curriculum, student evaluation, staffing, non-instructional service
and community involvement.”338
Although the Tenth Circuit failed to explain how the traditional
desegregation remedies did not disrupt the educational system, the court
made clear that bilingual and multicultural education “is not a substitute for
desegregation.”339 Most importantly, the Tenth Circuit rejected the
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complexity of post-World War II struggles among African Americans and
Mexican Americans to achieve equality of educational opportunity in the
Denver Public Schools. As a consequence, the court dramatically limited
the implications of the Supreme Court’s 1973 decision and Judge Doyle’s
subsequent tri-ethnic remedy by failing to approve a remedy beyond the
traditional busing and racial balanceing approach.340
The Tenth Circuit explained that “[t]he clear implication of arguments in
support of the court’s adoption of the Cardeñas Plan is that minority
students are entitled under the Fourteenth Amendment to an educational
experience tailored to their unique cultural and development needs.
Although enlightened educational theory may well demand as much, the
Constitution does not.”341 While Chicanos were now considered black for
purposes of constitutional law, it was evident that courts were not prepared
to provide a remedy that contemplated their own distinct non-white and
non-black racial identity.342 At the same time that the court dramatically
limited the ability of the Denver Public Schools to overcome the tri-ethnic
racial lines of the city, many Denver parents worked to preserve Denver’s
racial boundaries.343 To illustrate, “some grumbled and talked of organizing
an alternate school system. Some moved to the suburbs; others put their
children in private institutions.”344 Still others turned to often violent and
extralegal means to maintain the heterogeneity of their neighborhoods and
schools.345 By 1974, anti-integrationists used the city’s tri-racial divisions
to encourage Colorado citizens to pass the Poundstone Amendment to the
Colorado State Constitution.346
Touted by its supporters as a measure to deprive Denver of power over
the metropolitan area, the Poundstone Amendment greatly limited the
ability of the city to acquire land through annexation in order to end
metropolitan educational segregation.347 One editorial noted,
It is, I think, right to suppose that the primary reason for the easy
passage of the Poundstone Amendment was the suburbs’ fear of
busing. If, in other words, there is to be a ghetto, and busing is to
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relieve the pressures and injustice of the ghetto, let it all be within
the City and County—and school district—of Denver.”348
According to one study, the Amendment allowed “Colorado voters
permanently [to] split Denver from its suburbs in the 1974 election.
Suburbanites decided that remaining separate from the city would permit
them to maintain racially and economically segregated communities and
schools, and to thereby evade the social and economic problems of the
central city.”349 In 1975, bi-racial tensions (white versus “non-white”)
divided the metropolitan area while tri-racial differences, forged in the years
and decades after World War II, invariably complicated efforts to achieve
legal and social equality in the city.

IV. CONCLUSION
Shortly after January 1, 1969, the Denver Chamber of Commerce and the
Denver School Board distributed a joint memo to Denver’s business and
industrial community. Headlined “Here could lie a potentially great city!”
the memo included a drawing of a cemetery with gravestones for Detroit,
Newark, Watts, Chicago, and New York City. Situated prominently in the
center of the image sat a gravestone that read: “DENVER: BORN–1859,
DIED–1969. CAUSE OF DEATH, SEGREGATED EDUCATION.”350
Less than a year later, the slow death knell for the city seemed to be
underway. The most prominent indicator of Denver’s demise centered on
the intense passions raised by school desegregation. While Denver Public
School buses and Judge Doyle’s house were bombed, Denverites were
bitterly divided over the social, political, and legal meaning of integration.
The “Great City” envisioned by the Denver Chamber of Commerce and
the Denver School Board eroded further through the city’s multiracial
tensions. Although white and non-white school desegregation issues
received the most publicity in the 1970s, violence in Denver’s Chicano and
black communities also harkened unsavory images of Harlem, Detroit, and
Los Angeles. In 1973, for instance, a nearly four-hour gun battle between
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Chicano activists affiliated with the Crusade for Justice and Denver Police
culminated in the death of a young Chicano man and the explosion of an
apartment building.351
Throughout the 1970s, Denver’s Chicano activists repeatedly clashed
with the police over the issues of guns, bombs, violence, and brutality.352
By the 1980s, health, education, and welfare “became a lower priority for
Denver and the nation as a whole. The gap between rich and poor
expanded, and the percentage of people living below the poverty line grew
at an alarming rate.”353 In the realm of education, only 43 percent of
Chicanos completed high school.354 Moreover, the Poundstone Amendment
and other state policies limiting Denver’s growth had a significant
economic and demographic impact on the metropolitan area.355 As a result,
Denver was unable to expand and to develop highly profitable commercial
and residential properties.356 According to one study, these developments
ensured that Denver was “denied . . . substantial numbers of middle-class
and affluent residents who might have provided resources . . . for the city
and its schools” as well as the fiscal benefits that would have resulted from
commercial and residential development.357 The Poundstone Amendment
allowed Denver’s suburbanites to decide “that remaining separate from the
City would permit them to maintain racially and economically segregated
communities and schools, and to evade the social and economic problems
of the central city.”358
The multiracial transformation of Denver in the second half of the
twentieth century and subsequent battles continue to this very day.
Although the Keyes case officially ended in 1996, the battle for educational
equality in the city’s public schools remains heated. Not surprisingly, the
racial character of the city lies at the heart of many debates. Denverites, as
well as most Americans, still cannot agree on a common understanding of
the meaning of race and equality in the metropolis. Were differences that
remained in Denver and American society the result of racial ideologies, or
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were they the result of other factors, including ethnicity and economic
status?
In a recent editorial, the Rocky Mountain News highlighted the inability
to answer such questions when it declared that a 2004 study was “nonsense”
when the study alleged that Denver and Colorado schools were among the
least integrated in the nation, especially for Hispanic students.359 According
to the article, the reality of segregation in Denver’s public schools is “in fact
. . . a lot less ominous than its principal author would have us believe” as a
result of “huge influx of Hispanic immigrants [in the 1990s] . . . [who]
tended to cluster in the same neighborhoods rather than disperse throughout
the city. It would be miraculous under such circumstances if many schools
hadn’t found themselves with far greater concentrations of ‘minority’
students. . . . The challenge isn’t ethnicity these days; it’s socioeconomic
status.”360 The Rocky Mountain News analysis, however, failed to consider
that in the 1940s and 1950s, a similar demographic influx of both Mexican
Americans and African Americans created segregated schools. While
socioeconomic status was certainly a factor in this development, it is
important to remember that the extreme racial categorization of the groups
and the legal and social barriers that were in place ensured that neither
group would be able to effectively enter mainstream American society.
The issue, then and today, is not socioeconomic status, ethnicity, or some
other social factor, but rather a recognition of the multiracial color lines and
identities that emerged in post-World War II United States. Significantly,
these were lines and identities that were given meaning by the complicated
interplay of law and social change, which were represented most vividly in
the context of school desegregation in Denver.
The struggle for equality of educational opportunity and the recent
histories of demographically diverse post-war urban cities gave courts an
unprecedented opportunity to develop principles, methodologies, and
understandings of the multiracial character of the law. Keyes provided such
an opportunity. Although most studies of the Keyes decision have focused
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on the case’s distinction between de jure versus de facto discrimination in
constitutional law, there is little commentary on the Court’s analysis of
Denver’s multiracial student body.361 The extended treatment of the issue at
both the trial court and the Supreme Court, however, altered not only the
dynamics of the desegregation struggle but also recognized, for a moment, a
multiracial United States.
Although Denver’s diverse racial populations challenged the usefulness
of the black-white dichotomy in constitutional law, the Tenth Circuit’s
rejection of Judge Doyle’s desegregation remedy ensured that Chicanos
never seriously threatened the polarized premises of American
jurisprudence. In the legal battle to desegregate Denver’s schools, Mexican
Americans were consistently described in relation to their relative whiteness
or blackness, not their Chicanoness. Whether they were considered “other
white” or, more recently, “other black,” Mexican American students were
denied a viable constitutional remedy and were left to compete with African
Americans for limited resources in non-white Denver.
The attempt of Denver students, parents, educators, activists, lawyers,
and judges to come to grips with its multiracialized citizenry suggests the
challenges facing a demographically changing United States. The equality
claims of Denver’s diverse student body vividly demonstrated the extent
that all these groups not only distinguished themselves, but also claimed
legal rights in multiracial terms. Although in 1973 the United States
Supreme Court wanted to use tri-ethnic Denver to develop national
principles of equality, subsequent jurisprudence and legislative acts limited
the implications of that decision and instead reinforced the bi-racial fiction
of law. Thus, despite the efforts of Denver’s Chicanos to declare that their
“Selma” would take place in the city’s public schools, the law failed to
appreciate the multiracial transformation of the United States.

VOLUME 3 • ISSUE 1 • 2004

124 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

1

Tom I. Romero II is Assistant Professor of Law at Hamline University School of Law.
I would like to acknowledge the great debt I owe to Thomas A. Green, María Montoya,
Terrence McDonald, Nancy Burns, Robert Self, Richard Delgado, Jean Stefancic, and
Laurie Blumberg-Romero for their close reading of earlier drafts as well as their critical
evaluations of the ideas presented in this article. I also want to thank the editors at the
Seattle Journal of Social Justice for their diligent and outstanding work.
2
Charles Carter, Rights Leader: Integration Plan Talks Disrupted, DENVER POST, Oct.
27, 1968, at 1.
3
See Frederick D. Watson, Removing the Barricades From the Northern Schoolhouse
Door: School Desegregation in Denver 105–107 (1993) (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation,
University of Colorado at Boulder) (on file with Auraria Library, University of Colorado
at Boulder).
4
Carter, supra note 2, at 1.
5
The terminology used to describe the various communities in this article has a
contentious and by no means settled genealogy. In fact, the changing terms reflect
important transformations in the racial identities of each group and their subsequent legal
claims to equal rights. As will become evident by the end of the text, these shifting and
multiple racial identities raised some of the most challenging issues for those involved in
school desegregation in the decades after Brown v. Board of Education. Accordingly, I
attempt to strike a balance between the various ways that historical actors labeled social
groups in particular time periods in contrast to more inclusive and empowering
contemporary categories of racial self-identification. To maintain this balance, I use
quotes (“”) when I reference group identities for the first time. All subsequent references
that I make will use more contemporary nomenclature (e.g. White, Mexican American,
Black, Asian, etc.). When I quote materials, however, I will not change the manner or the
form in which the historical figures in this article used and deployed racial terms and
categories.
6
See, e.g., Tom I. Romero, II, Wearing the Red, White, and Blue Trunks of Aztlán:
Rodolfo “Corky” Gonzales and the Convergence of American and Chicano Nationalism,
29 AZTLAN: J. OF CHICANO STUD. 83–117 (2004).
7
Carter, supra note 1, at 1.
8
In 1968, a contentious and bitterly divided Denver Public School Board ordered Dr.
Robert Gilberts to prepare an integration plan by September 1968. In the final product,
“Planning Quality Education: A Proposal for Integrating the Denver Public Schools,” Dr.
Gilberts proposed busing for minority students who wanted to transfer to White schools
with open space, the continued maintenance of the neighborhood school, and the creation
of “cluster” elementary, junior, and senior high schools to provide administrative and
academic support to the neighborhood school. Though the Gilberts Plan did not call for
major change of the Denver Public School system’s current practices, its
recommendations—particularly the limited busing—provoked heated exchanges in the
ensuing public hearings and School Board deliberations. Watson, supra note 3, at 94–
109.
9
Carter, supra note 1, at 1.
10
Id.
11
Id.

FROM BROWN TO GRUTTER: RACIAL INTEGRATION AND THE LAW

Our Selma Is Here 125

12

Id.
Id.
14
When Gonzales refused to give up the microphone, Board Members James D.
Voorhees, William G. Berge, and Stephen J. Knight left the stage. Id. These members,
in particular Stephen Knight, were vocal opponents of school integration. See infra notes
109–113.
15
Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
16
Id.
17
Id. at 196–198.
18
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954); Anthony Lewis, Since the Supreme
Court Spoke: It’s Historic Decision on School Desegregation Launched ‘the Racial
Decade’ in America—Ten Years Of Irreversible Revolution In The Patterns Of NegroWhite Relations, N.Y. TIMES (Sunday Magazine), May 10, 1964, at 9. For the most
recent synthesis of the importance of the decision, see JAMES T. PATTERSON, BROWN V.
BOARD OF EDUCATION: A CIVIL RIGHTS MILESTONE AND ITS TROUBLED LEGACY
(2001).
19
See also Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); Goss v. Bd. of Educ., 373 U.S. 683
(1963); Griffin v. Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Green v. Sch.
Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430 (1968); and, Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg
Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1(1971).
20
The African American story to dismantle Jim Crow in the Cold War United States is
well-known and extensively documented. For a synthesis of this literature, see GARY
GERSTLE, AMERICAN CRUCIBLE: RACE AND NATION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 268–
310 (2001). Particularly important were the highly publicized fights to desegregate
schools, open public accommodations, and voting rights. In the aftermath of Brown, for
instance, violent confrontations in Little Rock, Arkansas, in 1957, put the nation on the
brink of Constitutional and international crisis. See MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR
CIVIL RIGHTS 115–151 (2000). During the early 1960s, civil rights activists known as
Freedom Riders consistently confronted violence from local southern authorities. See
CLAYBORNE CARSON, IN STRUGGLE: SNCC AND THE BLACK AWAKENING OF THE 1960S
31–44 (1981).
21
In 1965, civil rights activists began a series of peaceful marches in Selma, Alabama to
focus nationwide attention on the disenfranchisement of African Americans. As the days
went by, hundreds of activists were arrested and widespread police brutality occurred.
On March 7, 1965, Alabama state troopers descended upon the activists and beat them
with nightsticks, trampled them with horses, and unleashed tear gas. In national news
reports, “nightsticks could be seen through the gas, flailing at the head of the marchers.”
DAVID J. GARROW, PROTEST AT SELMA: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. AND THE VOTING
RIGHTS ACT OF 1965, at 394–399 (1978). A few days later, President Johnson sadly
proclaimed: “What happened in Selma was an American tragedy. The blows that were
received, the blood that was shed . . . must strengthen the determination of each of us to
bring full and equal and exact justice to all of our people. . . . It is the heart and purpose
and meaning of America itself.” DUDZIAK, supra note 20, at 232.
22
Justice Brennan pointed out that school segregation in Denver allowed the Court to
develop “constitutional principles of national rather than merely regional application.”
13

VOLUME 3 • ISSUE 1 • 2004

126 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

Keyes, 413 U.S. at 219. In a fundamental way, the case represented a critical revaluation
of America’s White and Black dilemma. See GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN
DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1944).
23
In Jones v. Newlon, the Colorado Supreme Court held that the Denver School Board’s
decision to segregate “Colored” and “White” pupils at social functions as a result of
“certain unpleasant incidents” violated the state’s constitution. 253 P. 386, 387 (Colo.
1927). Courts in many other Western states, however, either upheld the constitutionality
of segregated schools or ignored policies and practices that created such a result. See
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Salvetierra, 33 S.W. 2d 790, 795 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930); Dameron v.
Bayless, 126 P. 273, 275 (Ariz. 1912).
24
See Tom I. Romero, II, Of Race and Rights: Legal Culture, Social Change, and the
Making of a Multiracial Metropolis, at ch. 1 (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Michigan
2004) (on file with the Seattle Journal for Social Justice).
25
Christmas-Chanukah Observances: The Denver Experiment, Draft of Talk given to the
Temple Men’s Club, Wilshire Boulevard Temple, Los Angles, CA (Mar. 7, 1956), in
Anti-Defamation League Collection, Beck Archives, Denver Public Library, Box 11, FF
6, at 11 [hereinafter ADL Collection].
26
Id.
27
DENVER PUBLIC SCHOOLS, PEOPLE OF DENVER: BOOK ONE, SPANISH-SPEAKING
PEOPLE ix. (1951).
28
Id.
29
In the late 1940s and early 1950s, tensions between Mexican American and
particularly Jewish students was especially acute. Accordingly, relatively minor
incidents turned into “gang” conflict between Mexican Americans and Anglo students.
See also Report of Meeting Held Concerning ‘Lake Junior High Incident’ reported in
Rocky Mountain News, Oct. 3, 1949, in CHR Papers, Box 2; Principal’s Report and
Recommendations to the Lake Human Relations Council, Mar. 2, 1950, in CHR Papers,
Box 2; Minutes of the Lake Junior High School Human Relations Council, Mar. 2, 1950,
in CHR Papers, Box 2; Garden Hose Cools Fighting Spirit: Gang Battle at School
Broken Up by Woman, ROCKY MTN. NEWS (Denver), Oct. 1, 1949, at 22; Inter-Racial
Friendship at Lake Jr. High, INTERMOUNTAIN JEWISH NEWS (Denver), Oct. 6, 1949, at
1; Robert S. Gamzey, Mile High View, INTERMOUNTAIN JEWISH NEWS (Denver), Sept. 5,
1950, at 1.
30
Denver Commission on Human Relations, Inventory on Human Relations, Sept.-Oct.
1954, at 172–173.
31
Id. at 173.
32
See DENVER PUBLIC SCHOOLS, supra note 27, at ix.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
JAMES A. ATKINS, HUMAN RELATIONS IN COLORADO: A HISTORICAL RECORD 163
(1968).
37
Representation on the City-School Project included fifteen principals and faculty from
schools with heavy concentrations of “Spanish-speaking” youth, representatives from the
Mayor’s Commission on Human Relations, the Denver Public Schools, the Mayor’s

FROM BROWN TO GRUTTER: RACIAL INTEGRATION AND THE LAW

Our Selma Is Here 127

office, the Department of Health and Hospitals, Recreation, Housing, Public Welfare, and
the Juvenile Bureau of the Denver Police Department. Id. at 163.
38
Id. at 162.
39
Id.
40
Evaluation Report City-Schools Project for Work Among Spanish-Named People of
Denver, Sept. 1957, at 4–11.
41
Romero, supra note 24, 381–383.
42
Memorandum from Ed Lucas to Commission on Human Relations, Mar. 2, 1953, in
CHR Papers, Box 2.
43
Letter from Travis Taylor to Helen Burke, Mar. 29, 1955, in CHR Papers, Box 2.
44
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
45
Jack Gaske, Programs Menaced in Denver Schools, ROCKY MTN. NEWS (Denver),
July 22, 1962.
46
For example, one Denver proponent noted that “the Jewish child . . . sees his Christian
friends participating in activities which are obviously not only enjoyable but also ones
which appear quite proper. . . . He may frequently translate this feeling of being different
into one of self-group inferiority.” Letter on ‘Religious Holidays and the Child,’ attached
to ‘Your ADL Reports,’ 1952, in ADL Collection, Box 11, FF 3.
47
See also Romero, supra note 24, 173–176; Minutes of Meeting with Mayor and
Members of Spanish-Speaking Community, Feb, 11, 1959, in CHR Papers, Box 2.
48
George Brown, Keynoter Hits Out at Churches: Baptists Tackle Explosive School
Integration, Civil Rights Issues, DENVER POST, Sept. 8, 1956, at 3. See also Barbara
Browne, Negro Minister Says Integration To Advance U.S. Cultural Pattern, ROCKY
MTN. NEWS (Denver), Sept. 5, 1956.
49
Brown, supra note 48.
50
Id. at 3.
51
Betty Jean Lee, Manual-Cole Parents Charge School Opportunity Not Equal, and
Oberholtzer Defends Manual’s Curriculum, DENVER POST, Apr. 5, 1956, at 40.
52
One former student noted that during the late 1940s, Manual was a “dismal and soul
stifling place. . . . During lunch, [W]hite kids were allowed to dance in the gym while
Black students were forced to have their social hour in a vacant second floor room. . . .
The prom was usually held at the Brown Palace Hotel because it restricted Blacks.”
Watson, supra note 3, at 26.
53
Id. at 14.
54
The Denver School Board in 1953 decided to fix the eastern boundary of the school’s
attendance area at York Street; a street separating the largely African American Five
Points neighborhood from the increasingly integrated Clayton Park neighborhood. In
turn, the Denver School Board gave parents in Clayton Park the option of sending their
children to the overcrowded, but predominately White East High School of Clayton Park
or to the under-capacity, but predominantly minority Manual. At this time, “East High
School was over capacity by about five hundred students, while Manual was under
capacity by about six hundred students.” Id.
55
Id.
56
Id. at 48.
57
Id. at 15.

VOLUME 3 • ISSUE 1 • 2004

128 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

58

Id.
Id. at 16–18.
60
Betty Jean Lee, Plans Caused Controversy: School Boundary Changes Approved,
DENVER POST, June 21, 1956, at 2.
61
Watson, supra note 3, at 16.
62
Id. at 16–25.
63
Id. 20. See also Lee, supra note 51, at 40.
64
Watson, supra note 3,at 16-20.
65
Id. at 22.
66
Id. at 16–17.
67
Jack Gaske, Group Renews Charges of School Segregation, ROCKY MTN. NEWS
(Denver), May 17, 1956, at 49.
68
Id.
69
Lee, supra note 60, at 2.
70
Betty Jean Lee, Schools Face ‘Segregation’ Suit: Minorities Hit Denver Proposal,
DENVER POST, July 11, 1956.
71
Id. at 1.
72
Denver Urban League, Fact-Letter: A Focus on Education, Aug. 1957, in Keyes
Collection, Box 2, FD 5.
73
Id.
74
Betty Jean Lee, Schools Deny Race Segregation in Boundaries, Hiring Policy Hit,
DENVER POST, Jan. 15, 1956, at 2A.
75
Watson, supra note 3, at 29.
76
Id.
77
In Brown v. Board of Education, African American students “[i]in each instance . . .
have been denied admission to schools attended by white children under laws requiring
or permitting segregation according to race.” 347 U.S. 483, 487 (1954). Accordingly,
the standard laid down by the Court focused on laws or official policies explicitly
segregating White and “non-White” students.
78
Although unstated, this is one of the earliest recognitions of the distinction between de
jure as opposed to de facto segregation. Indeed, it was open question whether a school
board who never adopted an explicit policy to segregate students, nevertheless had a duty
to respond to the reality that residential segregation caused segregated schools. Urban
League Board Director and Colorado Supreme Court Justice Albert Franz, noted the
problem: “We cannot as a professional agency accuse the school board of the intent to
discriminate unfairly, but neither can we deny the basis for such feeling on the part of the
Negro community.” Urban League Skips Stand on Schools, DENVER POST, May 21,
1956, at 40.
79
ACLU Holds Off on Race Suit, DENVER POST, Oct. 30, 1956, at 15.
80
GEORGE E. BARDWELL, PARK HILL AREAS OF DENVER, 1950–1966, at 23
(Commission on Community Relations for City of Denver 1966). Although there were
predominately White schools whose attendance districts crossed busy streets, the Denver
Public School Board—in the name of safety—set the attendance boundary at Colorado
Boulevard. Black parents and community activists believed that such actions were done
to deliberately segregate Black students in inferior schools. Watson, supra note 3, at 30–
59

FROM BROWN TO GRUTTER: RACIAL INTEGRATION AND THE LAW

Our Selma Is Here 129

32. As in 1959, the Denver School Board proposed relieving overcrowding at
predominately Black, Cole Junior High School, by building a new junior high on the
western corner of 32nd Avenue and Colorado Boulevard. Despite a DPS report that
indicated that Gove and Smiley Junior High Schools in predominately White Park Hill
were operating under-capacity, the Denver School Board—against the pleas of many
Black parents—proposed to again set the attendance boundaries for the new school at
Colorado Boulevard. Vocal protest on the part of several Black and “White” parents and
activists, however, led the Board to shelve the proposal until it could “study” the
situation. See id. at 41–43. In addition, the DPS Board proposed to relieve additional
overcrowding at Cole by shifting “Black” students from Cole to Morey Junior High to the
south. Morey, a predominately White school, was “76 percent under capacity.”
Objections by the Morey parents, however, led the board to extend its “optional” area to
Morey students so they could attend the all-”White” Byers Junior High. As a result,
White “enrollment at Morey Junior High declined by 49%.” Id. at 49–51. In one letter,
one Park Hill resident expressed his fear that, “[by] busing approximately 500 or more
pupils in from the underprivileged sections of Five Points . . . we will eventually become
a completely segregated district.” Letter from Lester Friedman to Jackson Fuller (Nov.
19, 1963), in Park Hill Action Committee (Interdenominational) and Greater Park Hill
Community Incorporated Collection, Special Collections Dept., Penrose Library,
University of Denver, Box 3, FF 4, [hereinafter PHAC Collection].
81
Watson, supra note 3, at 42–43.
82
Id.
83
See DENVER PUBLIC SCHOOLS, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE BOARD
(1964).
84
Watson, supra note 3, at 51.
85
Id. at 51–52.
86
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE BOARD (1964), supra note 83, at 6–7.
87
The Committee found that the African Americans and Chicanos lived in overcrowded
and poorly maintained housing, suffered from chronic unemployment, lacked the skills to
compete in an urban and industrial society, blindly adhered to values as odds with “the
dominant urban middle class culture,” and members from each ground had little
motivation for “traditional education” while each possessed “lower educational
standards.” Id. at 4–5. Such sentiments echoed a plethora of post-World War II reports
conducted by a variety of Denver’s municipal agencies concerning Denver’s “minority”
communities. See also Romero, supra note 24, at 136–156.
88
Id. at 3.
89
Watson, supra note 3, at 52–53
90
Oberholtzer to Board of Education, May 6, 1964, in PHAC Collection, Box 5, FF 10,
at 1.
91
Id.
92
Shortly after the Committee submitted its findings, the DPS Board and Administration
drafted Policy 5100, offered open enrollment for the 1964-1965 academic year at twentynine (out of 117) schools, eliminated optional areas, instituted compensatory education
programs, and began to keep statistics on the number of “Anglo,” “Negro,” “Spanish

VOLUME 3 • ISSUE 1 • 2004

130 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

American,” “Oriental,” and “Indian” students in their schools. See id.; Watson, supra
note 2, at 52-53.
93
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE BOARD (1964), supra note 83, at Appendix
9; DENVER PUBLIC SCHOOLS, FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE BOARD
10 (1967); Watson, supra note 3, at 52–53. DPS officials argued that busing was used
only in schools and areas where overcrowding was seen as temporary. In those areas
where overcrowding was seen as permanent, however, DPS officials sought to use
temporary mobile units, build additions to schools, or build a new school. Jack Gaske,
School Concept Faces Acid Test, ROCKY MTN. NEWS (Denver), Dec. 21, 1965, at 86.
Such actions, however, only exacerbated the racial divide when the DPS officials found
that of the 29 mobile units in use in the entire Denver Public School system, 28 were at
schools with substantial “Negro” and “Spanish-surnamed” populations. FINAL REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE BOARD (1967), supra, at 10.
94
Watson, supra note 3, at 55.
95
Id. at 70–76; Jack Gaske, Who’s in School: Minority, Majority Ratio Growing
Stronger, ROCKY MTN. NEWS (Denver), Mar. 14, 1966, at 6–7.
96
Greg Phinney, Park Hill’s Racial Schools Problem Stymies Officials, DENVER POST,
Jan. 19, 1966, at 88.
97
Id.
98
Watson, supra note 3, at 69–75.
99
Gaske, supra note 93, at 86.
100
Greg Pinney, Study of Segregation Bus Plan Improved, DENVER POST, Jan. 21, 1966,
at 1, 26; Watson, supra note 3, at 72–75.
101
Watson, supra note 3, at 76.
102
These council included members from such groups as the Park Hill Action
Committee, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the
Congress of Racial Equality, and the Latin American Research and Service Agency
(LARASA). Also included where members of Denver’s professional and municipal
communities. Id. at 76.
103
FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE BOARD (1967), supra note 93, at 30.
104
Id. at 39–40.
105
Id. at 30.
106
Id. at 31.
107
Id. at 35.
108
Id.
109
Id. at 39.
110
Watson, supra note 3, at 78–82
111
Id.
112
FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE BOARD (1967), supra note 93, at
181.
113
Id.
114
Id. at 184.
115
Id.
116
Watson, supra note 3, at 82.
117
Id. at 82.

FROM BROWN TO GRUTTER: RACIAL INTEGRATION AND THE LAW

Our Selma Is Here 131

118

Id. at 94.
Id.
120
Charles Carter, Integration Ordered: School Board Avoids Bus Issue, DENVER POST,
May 17, 1968, at 1,4. See also Negro Teacher Group Plans School Boycott, DENVER
POST, May 13, 1968; and Busing Should Be Voluntary, THE UNIVERSITY PARK NEWSCHERRY CREEK NEWS (Denver), May 9, 1968, in ADL Collection, Box 17, FF 7.
121
Watson, supra note 3, at 100.
122
Id.
123
The School Board Actions, known as Resolution 1520, 1524, and 1531 and enacted by
the Board respectively on January 30, 1969, March 20, 1969, and April 24, 1969, targeted
specifically those schools in East and Northeast Denver with large “African American”
communities. See id. at 107–108. Id. at 109.
124
Id. at 108.
125
Id. at 109. To get a sense of the intense passion revolving around the DPS’ school
desegregation resolutions, see School Integration—I: Part-Time or Full Time?, DENVER
POST, Sept. 19, 1968; Charles Carter, Panel Hears Talks Backing Integration, DENVER
POST, Sept. 27, 1968, at 35; Charles Carter, School Plan Criticism Mounts, DENVER
POST, Nov. 27, 1968; If It’s Change, They’re Against It, DENVER POST, Nov. 26, 1968, at
20.
126
See Romero, supra note 18, at ch. VII.
127
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE BOARD (1964), supra note 83, at 4–5;
FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE BOARD (1967), supra note 93, at 11.
128
Carter, supra note 1, at 1.
129
Id.
130
Martin Moran, Charges Against Teacher Are Called Unfounded, ROCKY MTN. NEWS
(Denver), Mar. 21, 1969, at 8.
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
Id.
134
Prelude to Disturbance: Complaint Against Teacher, DENVER POST, Mar. 20, 1969, at
3. Later, Shafer backed away from these comments and argued, instead, that he was
misquoted and that his statements were taken out of context. Fred Giles & Bob Huber,
Teacher Caught in West Storm Gets Student Backing, DENVER POST, Mar. 30, 1969.
135
See Bob Saile, Teacher Hub in Controversy, DENVER POST, Mar. 21, 1969; Moran,
supra note 130; Giles & Huber, supra note 134.
136
Saile, supra note 135, at 46.
137
Moran, supra note 130; Saile, supra note 135, at 46.
138
Prelude to Disturbance, supra note 134, at 3.
139
Id.
140
Id.
141
Id.
142
Id.
143
Id.; Duane Howell & Ira Gay Sealy, Clash at West High, DENVER POST, Mar. 20.
1969, at 68; SDS Urges Support of West Students, ROCKY MTN. NEWS (Denver), Mar.
22, 1969, at 8.
119

VOLUME 3 • ISSUE 1 • 2004

132 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

144

Prelude to Disturbance, supra note 132, at 3.
Howell & Sealy, supra note 143, at 68.
146
There is some question about whether other students joined the march and
demonstration. Mainstream newspaper accounts indicate that only West High students
participated in the walkouts. See id. Bill Marvel, West High School Students and Police
Fight, ROCKY MTN. NEWS (Denver), Mar. 21, 1969, at 1. Other accounts, however,
indicate a much fuller participation. See ERNESTO VIGIL, THE CRUSADE FOR JUSTICE:
CHICANO MILITANCY AND THE GOVERNMENT’S WAR ON DISSENT 83 (1999).
147
VIGIL, supra note 146, at 83.
148
Marvel, supra note 146, at 1, 5.
149
Id. at 1
150
Id.
151
SDS Urges Support of West Students, supra note 143, at 8.
152
VIGIL, supra note 146, at 85.
153
George Kane, One Man Shot in New Violence at West High, ROCKY MTN. NEWS
(Denver), Mar. 22, 1969, at 5 (emphasis added). See VIGIL, supra note 146, at 85.
154
See VIGIL, supra note 144, at 85; Duane Howell et al., From East to Manual to West,
DENVER POST, Mar. 21, 1969, at 72; Militants Join Move for Boycott at West, DENVER
POST, Mar. 21, 1969, at 1.
155
Kane, supra note 153, at 5.
156
Militants Join Move, supra note 152, at 1.
157
Bob Jain, 400 Support School Boycott, DENVER POST, Mar. 21, 1969, at 46. Like the
previous day’s events, however, the demonstration was again marred by violence. As
police and demonstrators again clashed, one man was shot as Denver Police armed
themselves with shotguns, filled with birdshot, to protect themselves and “private
citizens” who were “pinned down” by the “ranging (sic) mobs.” Kane, supra note 151, at
5; Birdshot Fired by Police Answers Rock Barrage: 1 Wounded in Skirmish Near West,
DENVER POST, Mar. 22, 1969. Walkouts by “Chicano/a” students were also reported at a
few schools in “suburban” Adams and Arapahoe counties. See VIGIL, supra note 146, at
87. Although violence between police and students did not escalate further, racial
tensions not only in West, but throughout the city remained high. Indeed, for the
remainder of the school year, “shot-gun wielding police offices were stationed inside”
West High School. George Kane, Parents Present Demands at West High, ROCKY MTN.
NEWS (Denver), Mar. 25, 1969, at 5.
158
See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
159
Violence at West High School, ROCKY MTN. NEWS (Denver), Mar. 23, 1969, at 6. See
also John Dunning, West Incident Laid to Small Minority, DENVER POST, Mar. 25, 1969,
at 1; Bill Myers, Police Chief Ties Adults to Violence, DENVER POST, Mar. 25, 1969, at 3.
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175
Watson, supra note 3, at 111.
176
Id.
177
Two of the named and racially described plaintiffs, “Negro” Kris Colley, and
“Hispano” Carlos Perez, respectively attended East and West High Schools—schools that
were at the center over the battle to eliminate discriminating and bias from Denver’s
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Declaratory Judgment, June 19, 1969, in Keyes Collection, Box 4, Book 1, Vol. 1.
178
Wikepedia, The Free Encyclopedia, Dwight D. Eisenhower, at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dwight_D._Eisenhower (last visited Nov. 20, 2004).
179
See Roscoe Drummond, Ike: A Great American, DENVER POST, Mar. 29, 1969, at 12.
180
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
181
Tom Cadwallader, Racial Confrontation, DENVER POST, Mar. 29, 1969, at 12; Roy
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For example, the court looked at Boulevard, Crofton, Ebert, Garden Place, Gilpin, Wyatt,
and Wyman elementary schools, Baker and Morey junior high schools, and East, West,
and Manual high schools.
262
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The complaint alleges that the minors of public school age in the Indo-Hispano
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Anglo-American. The classes of ‘Indo-Hispano’ or non-Indo-Hispano’, as
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Lopez Tijerina v. Henry, 48 F.R.D. 274, 275–76 (D. N.M. 1960). The plaintiffs
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Id. at 604.
281
Id. at 606 n. 27.
282
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both groups led to a “dual school system.” Id. at 615. In making this determination,
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African American schools. Id. at 605–612, 616–623. And as in Denver, such
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Because the courts, especially in the South, are finding that a bi-racial or
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creating a unitary system and maintaining them, this court is of the opinion
that a human relations committee appointed by this court will be of great help.
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METROPOLIS 380 (1990).
289
Id.
290
Madestella C. Holcomb, Equality is the Key, DENVER POST, Feb. 19, 1970.
291
Id.
292
Plaintiff’s Opening Brief in Support of Cross-Appeal, in Keyes Collection, Box 4,
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467 F. 2d 142 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 922 (1973).The appellate court,
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Mexican American interveners in different school desegregation suit as White. Ross v.
Eckels, 467 F. 2d 649 (5th Cir. 1972).
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301
Id. at 256.
302
Id.
303
Id. at 195.
304
Id.
305
Id. at 196. Indeed, the Keyes plaintiff’s argued that the placement for Mexican
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first impression” for the court. Plaintiff’s Opening Brief in Support of Cross-Appeal,
supra note 292, at 6. The Plaintiff’s argued that they “are aware of no precedent for not
combining the minority groups.” Id.
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the Public Schools of the Southwest–Report 1 (Government Printing Office 1971).
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Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 380 F. Supp. 673, 695 (D. Colo. 1974), aff’d and rev’d in
part, 521 F.2d 465 (10th Cir. 1975).
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Id.
Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund, Memorandum of Law in
Support of Motion to Intervene as Parties Plaintiffs, in Keyes Collection, Box 5, Book 1,
at 13.
321
Id. at 22, 29. MALDEF argued that although Blacks and Chicanos shared common
questions of law and fact, courts needed to recognize appropriate remedies targeted to the
distinct needs of each group.
322
The “Cardeñas Plan,” which was drafted and submitted by Dr. Jose Cardeñas,
adopted the following as its guiding principles:
That the culture, heritage, and language of minorities are worthy of study and
recognition by the educational system, its students, and its personnel;
That the development of pride, coupled with resilience, will motivate minority
youngsters toward higher academic goals and aspirations;
That learning another language at very early age is instrumental for developing
a student’s appreciation of all languages;
That it is essential for students to participate in a strong oral English language
program before beginning other English language skills.
That it is essential for students initially to receive instructing in the dominant
language.
That it is essential for the schools to evidence concretely the recognition of
other cultures, especially those of the Southwest and Mexico.
That it is essential for the schools to make available materials which accurately
and objectively reflect the culture, history, and language of minorities.
Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund, Addendum to the Intervener’s
Plan for the Denver Public Schools (1974), in Keyes Collection, Box 5, Book 2, at 8.
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See discussion supra Part III and accompanying notes 138–140.
324
Addendum to the Intervener’s Plan for the Denver Public Schools, supra note 322, at
8–9.
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Id. at 1–4.
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Id. at 8.
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As Justice Earl Warren noted, to separate Black and White students “from others of
similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of
inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a
way unlikely ever to be undone.” Brown, 347 U.S. at 494. Judge Doyle in Keyes
explained such segregation and resulting inferiority as the “minority factor.” See supra
notes 41–42 and accompanying text.
328
MALDEF, supra note 321, at 6–7.
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Keyes, 380 F. Supp. at 696 (emphasis added).
330
Keyes, 313 F. Supp. At 69.
331
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Colorado State Bd. of Educ., Brief of Amicus Curiae, Sept. 6, 1974, in Keyes
Collection, Box 5, Book 5, at 16.
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Id. at 20. For similar arguments, see Colorado Assoc. of Sch. Executives, Brief of
Amicus Curiae, in Keyes Collection, Box 5, Book 5, at 27.
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Brief of Appellants Keyes in Support of Cross-Appeal, Sept. 10, 1974, in Keyes
Collection, Box 5, Book 5, at 57.
336
See Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Declaratory Judgment, supra note 177,
at 1–2.
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Keyes, 521 F.2d at 465.
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Id. at 480.
339
Id. at 480–81.
340
Id at 483.
341
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See, e.g., Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974) (upholding bilingual education program
aimed at children of Chinese ancestry). In Serna v. Portales Municipal Schools, the
Tenth Circuit held that lack of effective bilingual and bicultural education program
created unequal educational opportunity for Mexican American students. 499 F. 2d 1147
(10th Cir. 1974). Because both Lau and Serna were upheld on the basis of Title VI of the
1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000d, the Tenth Circuit ultimately concluded that
bilingual and bicultural programs were not an appropriate Fourteenth Amendment
remedy. Keyes, 521 F.2d at 480–82. Four years later, however, five justices of the
Supreme Court in Bakke concluded that Title VI’s prohibitions were co-extensive with
the Fourteenth Amendment. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 287
(Powell, J); Id. at 328 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ, concurring in part,
dissenting in part). This suggested that its proscriptions—including bilingual and
multicultural education—were co-extensive as well. By this time, however, the
parameters of desegregation in Denver were entrenched.
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Id. at 380.
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COLO. CONST., art. XX, § 1 and art. XIV, § 3. See also LEONARD & NOEL, supra
note 288, at 379. The Poundstone Amendment anticipated the Supreme Court’s 1977
ruling in Milliken v. Bradley that desegregation plans based upon the 14th Amendment
could not extend beyond the boundaries of a school district found by courts to be
segregated. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
347
LEONARD & NOEL, supra note 288, at 379.
348
Franklin J. James & Christopher B. Gerboth, A Camp Divided, Annexation Battles,
the Poundstone Amendment, and Their Impact on Metropolitan Denver 1941–1988,
COLO. HIST., 2001, at 173 n. 87. James and Gerboth’s study noted that Frida
Poundstone, the author of the Amendment, “intentionally stoked suburban fears by
raising the specter of court-ordered busing on a metropolitan scale.” Id. at 158.
349
Id. at 163.
350
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351
Frank Moya, Chicano-Police Gunfight, Bombing Kill 1, Injure 18, ROCKY MTN.
NEWS (Denver), Mar. 18, 1973; Harry Gessing & John Ashton, 1 Killed, 19 Hurt, 36
Held in Denver Gunfight, Blast, DENVER POST, Mar. 17, 1973.
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See James & Gerboth, supra note 348, at 163.
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See id.
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Id.
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Id.
359
The Nonsense About ‘Resegregated’ Schools, ROCKY MTN. NEWS (Denver), Jan. 23,
2004 (emphasis added).
360
Id. (emphasis added). See also Gary Orfield & Chungmei Lee, Brown at 50: King’s
Dream or Plessy’s Nightmare, THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT 2004.
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COURT AND SCHOOL INTEGRATION 1954–1978, at 193–202 (1979); PATTERSON, supra
note 18, at 160–162; Kevin Brown, Has the Supreme Court Allowed the Cure for De Jure
Segregation to Replicate the Disease?, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1992). Scholars,
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instance, Bowman, supra note 220, at 1751, and Margaret E. Montoya, A Brief History of
Chicana/o School Segregation: One Rationale for Affirmative Action, 12 LA RAZA L.J.
159 (2001).
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